

THE SCOTTISH PRAGMATIST? THE DILEMMA OF COMMON SENSE AND THE PRAGMATIST WAY OUT

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Most of us have a somewhat ambivalent attitude towards common sense. Without common sense, we would have a less robust sense of reality. As Nicholas Amhurst once said: "a man of common sense . . . knows . . . chalk from cheese."¹ However, we also tend to mistrust common sense. Isn't Anatole France right in saying that according to common sense the earth stands still with the sun turning around it and the antipodeans walking around upside down?² So, what shall we think about common sense? Can or should we trust in common sense and assent to its knowledge claims?

As we all know, philosophers disagree on this question. Following Joseph Priestley,³ it was mainly Immanuel Kant⁴ who brought or attempted to bring common sense into philosophical disrepute, at least in parts of the Continent. He says about the "appeal" to common sense: "Seen in a clear light, it is but an appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed, while the popular charlatan glories and confides in it."⁵ Compare, e.g., George Berkeley who expresses the intention "to be eternally banishing Metaphysics &c & recalling Men to Common Sense."⁶

If we want to attain a reflective view of common sense, we need to go back to Thomas Reid. He is *the* classical common sense philosopher, much more than, e.g., G. E. Moore. Furthermore, Reid has developed a theory of common sense of such complexity that it even helps us to gain a better understanding of the problematic status of common sense and our ambivalent (initial) attitude towards it. I want to argue here that Reid's theory of common sense implicitly contains a dilemma. It adds to the philosophical importance of Reid that this dilemma constitutes a central problem of any common sense philosophy. Moreover, one can even find hints at a solution of the dilemma in Reid: a pragmatist conception of knowledge. Even though neither the problem nor the solution are explicit in Reid's writings, they are both part of the implications of his theory. Let me start with Reid's arguments against scepticism. The refutation of scepticism is the main goal of Reid's philosophy and it leads him to his own conception of common sense (dilemma included). Hence, I need to say a bit about Reid on scepticism first.

I Scepticism

"Scepticism" can mean many different things. For Reid, it consists in doubting or denying the existence of an external world. He believed that scepticism results from a certain modern theory of mental representation developed and shared by Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and in particular by Hume⁷: the theory of ideas — the

THE SCOTTISH PRAGMATIST?

"ideal system" as Reid also called it. According to this theory, the human mind does not have direct access to the objects of knowledge and thought but only indirect access, via mental intermediaries called "ideas" which represent the objects of thought. We have direct access only to those ideas, e.g., to Hume's "impressions" and "ideas".⁸ According to Reid, it is this conception of thought and knowledge that opens up the possibility of sceptical doubt concerning the existence of an external world beyond our representations of this world: isn't it conceivable that our representations refer to nothing, that there are no objects corresponding to them? How could we exclude this possibility? How can we get knowledge about the external world? As soon as we accept the theory of ideas, we cannot avoid scepticism any more.⁹ This is why Reid called the theory of ideas the "Trojan horse" of scepticism: "it carried in its belly death and destruction to all science and common sense".¹⁰ In order to refute scepticism, we need, according to Reid, to refute the theory of ideas. He regarded this as the main goal and achievement of his philosophy.¹¹

Again and again, Reid says that there are no ideas, "that they are a mere fiction".¹² There is no reason to assume the existence of such mental representations or intermediaries.¹³ Rather, we directly refer to objects in the external world.¹⁴ Reid replaces the "ideal system" by a theory of direct perception, by direct realism.¹⁵ If I have, e.g., a perception of a table, then I directly refer to an object in the external world, a table, and not to the idea of a table.¹⁶ And the perception of a table implies the belief in the existence of a certain object in the external world.¹⁷ Direct realism is currently a much debated theory and Reid is one of its historical pioneers.

Let us suppose that the "theory of ideas" is a source of scepticism and that direct realism blocks one road to scepticism. This, however, does not mean that the sceptic has to give up. On the contrary: he could ask how we know that we have perceptions (in Reid's sense) at all. If we have such perceptions, then there must be an external world. If! But don't we have some reason to doubt that we have such perceptions at all? Furthermore: doesn't Reid's direct realism presuppose what it is supposed to make plausible, namely the existence of an external world?

Even if we don't worry any more about external world scepticism, there is another form of scepticism that might still worry us: the idea that — given the existence of an external world — we cannot have knowledge about facts in the external world. This kind of scepticism can result from the theory of ideas but it need not.¹⁸ Reid, of course, admits that we could hallucinate and, e.g., see a table before us even when there is no table before us. Or, we could also see a table before us when there is a sofa before us. Reid, however, makes the important point that our cognitive faculties are reliable, — that we usually attain true beliefs and knowledge about the world.¹⁹ Again and again he stresses that "the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious."²⁰ It is only in exceptional non-standard cases that we have reasons to doubt the reliability of our cognitive faculties. The sceptic ignores the fact that sceptical doubt can only be an exception. Reid thus adds reliabilism to direct realism: Realism guarantees the *objects* of knowledge, reliabilism guarantees *knowledge* of the objects. Like direct realism,

reliabilism is a currently often held position. In this regard, too, Reid is a pioneer and a classic.²¹

However, reliabilism cannot decisively meet the sceptical challenge. What could be the argument for reliabilism? If the argument presupposes that we can have knowledge about the external world, then it is of no use for the refutation of scepticism. But can there be a different kind of argument for reliabilism which does not presuppose that scepticism is wrong? Even if one grants the existence of an external world, one can still doubt the possibility of knowledge of this external world. Isn't it at least conceivable that we are in constant error about the world? This is a common sceptical scenario. What can Reid say here — except assure us that our cognitive faculties are reliable and thus assume but not show that scepticism is wrong?

Neither Reid's direct realism nor his reliabilism need worry the sceptic very much. It seems that Reid has not succeeded in his refutation of scepticism. Even worse, he seems to have missed the essential point of scepticism (perhaps like another important common sense philosopher, namely G. E. Moore).

But Reid has more to say here. And what he says is very important with regard to the general status of common sense. According to Reid, direct realism and reliabilism are basic principles of common sense, — first truths on which other truths are based.²²

Reid holds that these principles of common sense are principles "which need no proof, and which do not admit of direct proof."²³ Why don't they *admit* of proof? Well, according to Reid, our knowledge bears a deductive structure and all justification must come to an end somewhere. It comes to an end at the fundamental principles of common sense on which all knowledge is based.²⁴ This also explains why they don't need proof: it just makes no sense at all to ask for justification where necessarily no justification can be given.²⁵ I propose to call this argument of Reid's "the principle argument".

Reid has still another argument: belief in the first principles of common sense is part of our cognitive constitution or mental nature: "by the constitution of our nature, we are under a necessity of assenting to them."²⁶ We just cannot believe otherwise; we cannot but believe in the existence of an external world and we also cannot avoid believing that the world is basically and generally as we think that it is. Hence, a justification of this belief is neither possible nor called for.²⁷ Let us call this second argument "the constitution argument".

Let us take a look at both arguments. First the constitution argument. There is a lot to say here; I confine myself to one main point. Even if we cannot but believe that this or that is the case, we might still be wrong. Reid himself clearly draws the distinction between "true" and "holding true".²⁸ It is often objected against common sense philosophers like Reid that the natural character of a belief does not imply anything about its truth value. It is, however, the truth of our beliefs — and not their natural character — which mainly worries us in epistemology. Hence, the sceptic can conclude that the constitution argument has not even a role to play when we ask the relevant and even pressing question whether our beliefs are true

THE SCOTTISH PRAGMATIST?

and constitute knowledge.

Joseph Priestley pursues a similar line of criticism when he says that the "recourse to arbitrary instincts"²⁹ leads to scepticism and relativism.³⁰ We should not, according to Priestley, replace objective judgement by subjective instincts "depending upon the arbitrary constitution of our nature; which makes all truth to be a thing that is *relative* to ourselves only."³¹

Let me briefly add another point. How can we be sure that our nature makes us believe certain things such that we cannot believe otherwise? Is it really true that we are epistemically "unfree" in this sense? Perhaps it is only very hard but not impossible to believe otherwise than we usually do. Doesn't Reid's sceptical philosopher — during his moments of philosophical armchair speculation — succeed in overcoming his common sense nature? Furthermore, what counts as 'common sense' seems to be open to revision and historical change: not very long ago, most people would have been absolutely sure that it is a common sense triviality that, e.g., the earth is flat. The phenomenon of historical change should make us a bit sceptical concerning the idea that certain beliefs are just natural.

The main objection to the constitution argument, however, was that it does not tell us anything about truth and knowledge. The discussion of Reid's principle argument leads to similar results. This is the second and perhaps even more important argument for the fundamental status of the principles of common sense (in particular, direct realism and reliabilism). Here, too, there is a lot to say and I can only mention one main point which is analogous to the above objection: Principles, too, can be false.³² Proving that something is a principle does not imply proving that it is true. But this — whether it is true — is what we want to know and what we need to know if we try to refute the sceptic and try to show that certain principles form the basis of our knowledge. Reid, however, only tries to show that reliabilism and direct realism are principles.

Furthermore, the principle argument presupposes a deductivist conception of knowledge according to which all knowledge is based on general principles. This conception goes back to Aristotle's "Second Analytic" and was, of course, quite common in 17th and 18th century philosophy. One problem is that it plays down or even ignores the role and importance of induction. Another problem is the following one. Even if one believes in principles of knowledge — because all justification must come to an end — there need not be a particular point at which all justification must come to an end. Reid appears to think otherwise but it is hard to see an argument for this in his writings. Where justification stops seems to be a wholly pragmatic matter. If this is so, then principles are open to revision and historical change.

The main objection against the principle argument, however, was that Reid does not prove the truth of his principles. Again, we have to conclude that Reid's refutation of scepticism fails. The same seems true of his attempt not only to vindicate common sense but also to secure its status as the foundation of our knowledge.

II The Dilemma

But this is still not the last word. Reid explicitly says that the principles of common

sense could turn out to be false.³³ He thus does not want to say that what we take to be the principles of common sense might turn out not to be the principles of common sense. No, what he means is rather that whatever is a principle of common sense, might turn out to be false. This is stunning: how could the principles of knowledge, how could first truths, be false? And how can he admit what seems to be the central objection against his anti-sceptical strategy? It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Reid is inconsistent here. It is, however, very important not to stop here, to simply state the inconsistency and forget Reid's remark that the principles of common sense could be false. I want to argue here that Reid has a very important motive for his remark. This motive leads to a fundamental problem of any common sense philosophy whatsoever. Reid did not explicitly state this problem but he somehow "saw" the problem. It adds to Reid's philosophical stature that he somehow realized the basic problems and limitations of his own philosophical ideas.³⁴ So, what is the problem?

It is a dilemma. Now that we have taken a look at Reid's confrontation with scepticism we can say what the dilemma consists in. Its first horn is that we take the principles of common sense to be first truths. If they are first truths, then they come with truth and knowledge claims. In this case, however, the common sense philosopher has a heavy burden of proof on his shoulders: he needs to show that those principles are true and constitute knowledge. The sceptic exploits this burden of proof, holding that the common sense philosopher cannot possibly prove what he needs to prove. Kantian transcendental arguments are an anti-sceptical alternative but the common sense philosopher does, of course, not want to argue in this way.³⁵ He refuses rather to carry the burden of proof at all: arguing only for the thesis that we cannot argue for the principles of common sense. He thus moves close to a bad dogmatist neighborhood and risks becoming a dogmatist himself who just asserts the truth of his first principles without arguing for it. And we have seen that Reid's arguments for not arguing for the principles of common sense are not extremely convincing. But does Reid really want to be a dogmatist? Is he a dogmatist? I do not think so.

So much for the first horn of the dilemma: dogmatism. The second horn of the common sense philosopher's dilemma is not to make any truth and knowledge claims concerning the principles of common sense and thus to avoid any further justificatory burdens. This, however, is the direct road to the common sense philosopher's hell: to scepticism or to what Reid took to be Hume's position.³⁶ Reid does not want to travel on this road at all and he does not travel on it: according to him, the principles of common sense are principles of knowledge and basic truths. So, what can Reid do? Is there a "third way" for Reid between Humean scepticism on the one hand and dogmatism or Kantian transcendental arguments on the other hand?

Let me first say a bit more about the horns of the dilemma and begin with the first horn. It is important here to realize that for Reid the principles of common sense are a priori as well as synthetic. Only synthetic a priori principles — and not analytic "trifling propositions" — can serve as the basis of our knowledge about

THE SCOTTISH PRAGMATIST?

the world.³⁷ Here, Reid agrees with Kant.³⁸ This is quite remarkable, — given Kant's harsh critique of Reid and given the opposition between Reid and Kant so common in writings about the history of philosophy. In a way, Reid is quite close to Kant.³⁹ I would like to stress this, even if I do not want to go as far as Manfred Kuehn, who wrote that "without the Scots there would have been no Kant".⁴⁰

But how can Reid defend his conception of synthetic a priori knowledge? How can he answer Kant's fundamental question "How are synthetic a priori judgements possible?" In other words, how can Reid establish the truth of his principles of common sense, — their validity and not just the fact that people think they are valid?

It is here that Reid and Kant part company. Whereas for Kant the attempt to justify the principles of knowledge is at the core of his philosophy, Reid holds that any such attempt is bound to fail. Reid does not have a project like Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories (not even that of a metaphysical deduction). Kant saw this difference between himself and Reid very clearly.⁴¹ Nowadays philosophers are much more sceptical about transcendental deductions than they were two hundred years ago and in this respect they are rather on Reid's side.

But doesn't all this mean that Reid falls back on dogmatism and simply asserts the truth of the principles of common sense? One might think so if one shares the above critique of Reid's anti-sceptical strategy. However, in contrast to the other common sense philosophers of his time, Reid realized the dangers of dogmatism. This is why he explicitly said that the principles of common sense could turn out to be false. He thus expressed in a misleading way the idea that the dogmatic assertion of first truths is no acceptable philosophical position. Since Reid did not want — as we have seen — to fall into the other extreme, scepticism, he thus implicitly also expressed the fundamental dilemma of his philosophy: the unacceptability of the alternative between dogmatism and scepticism. There *must* be a third way for him.

III Pragmatism

It is quite interesting to see that there are indeed hints in Reid at such a third way out of the dilemma. I do not mean to say that Reid proposed a solution to a problem he did not even state explicitly. But his theory is rich enough to offer hints at a solution. Let me conclude by elaborating on these hints.

Reid was quite close not only to Kant but also to Hume, — much closer than he himself believed.⁴² He shares with Hume the naturalist idea that we just have and cannot avoid having certain beliefs about the world. Both, Reid as well as Hume,⁴³ believe that we cannot justify our fundamental beliefs. According to Thomas Brown, Reid and Hume differ only in the emphasis they put on the unjustifiability and the unavoidability of the principles of common sense: "... the sceptic pronounces the first [unjustifiability] in a loud tone of voice, and the second [unavoidability] in a whisper, while his supposed antagonist passes rapidly over the first, and dwells on the second with a tone of confidence."⁴⁴

Taking this naturalist element in Reid seriously, we get to the conclusion that the philosopher's task is rather to describe than to justify or criticize our view of the world. Reid says in the *Inquiry*:

Most men continue all their days to be just what Nature and human education made them. Their manners, their opinions, their virtues, and their vices, are all got by habit, imitation, and instruction; and reason has little or no share in forming them.⁴⁵

We cannot justify the principles of knowledge and we do not even need to justify them. This gives Reid's naturalism a pragmatist twist. The search for a theoretical justification of the principles of common sense does not even make sense. We are asking the wrong question if we want to know reasons for first principles. To ask for reasons here is to fundamentally misunderstand what a first principle is. This is what Reid says, except that he is not willing to stop talking about the truth and knowledge claims that come with the principles of common sense. To give up this recourse to truth and knowledge would mean to fully become a pragmatist.

Even if we cannot give justifying reasons for our principles of knowledge, we can give a totally different kind of justification: a pragmatic justification.⁴⁶ The principles of common sense enable us to build theories which guide our actions and let us attain our goals.⁴⁷ Insofar as they fulfill this function, they are justified and there is no place for a different kind of justification, no need to talk about truth or knowledge. This is very close to what Wittgenstein says in *On Certainty*: the principles of knowledge are neither true nor false.⁴⁸

To be sure, Reid does not make this last step. He does not really talk about pragmatic justification. But he is very close to this kind of pragmatism and I wanted to show here that he is much closer to pragmatism than one might think at first hand. One might even regard him as one of the grandfathers of pragmatism. Take Peirce for instance.⁴⁹ Peirce explicitly refers to Reid and the Scottish school⁵⁰ and it is no accident that he called his own philosophy "critical common-sensism".⁵¹ Similarly to Reid, Peirce holds that our common sense view of the world has a natural basis in our instincts.⁵² There is, according to Peirce, no sense in trying to doubt or prove our common sense beliefs.⁵³ In contrast, however, to Reid, Peirce allows for historical variation and critique of what common sense tells us.⁵⁴ Within limits, the principles of common sense are open to revision.⁵⁵ This foreshadows Quine's pragmatist idea that (almost) everything is open to revision.⁵⁶ Reid does not agree with this but perhaps he could agree easily: doesn't he already agree with Peirce's remark that common sense propositions may prove false?⁵⁷ As I already said above: it would make Reid's theory more plausible if he allowed for revision and change of his common sense propositions.

There is thus a short road that leads from Reid to pragmatist tendencies in recent philosophy: not only to American pragmatism but also, e.g., to Wittgenstein's later philosophy according to which our beliefs and world views are based on forms of life which are not or not completely open to doubt or justification.⁵⁸ All this

THE SCOTTISH PRAGMATIST?

gives us an idea of how Reid's theory *could* be modified and further developed. And it also reminds us that Reid is a classic: still our philosophical contemporary.

IV Conclusion

Let me conclude. I do not want to propose pragmatism here. Neither do I want to say that Reid was a full-blown pragmatist. But there is a very strong affinity with pragmatism in his philosophy. Not only has Reid developed a common sense theory of incomparable complexity and depth. He also felt the limitations and problems of any common sense philosophy. I have tried to show that Reid's theory leads to a dilemma. And there are even hints in Reid's theory at a solution of the dilemma: naturalist pragmatism.⁵⁹

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- 1 Nicholas Amhurst, *Terrae-Filius; or, The Secret History of the University of Oxford* (3. ed.), London: R. Francklin 1754, 100.
- 2 cf. the editor's remarks in: Voltaire, *Dictionnaire Philosophique*, Paris: Garnier 1967, 617.
- 3 cf. Joseph Priestley, *An Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, Dr. Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth and Dr. Oswald's Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion*, London: J. Johnson (2. ed.) 1775.
- 4 cf. Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können*, in: Immanuel Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Berlin: G. Reimer 1902ff., IV, 258f.
- 5 *ibid.*, 259 (translation by Paul Carus).
- 6 George Berkeley, *Philosophical Commentaries*, in: *George Berkeley, Works* (eds.: Arthur Aston Luce/ Thomas Edmund Jessop), vol. I, London: Nelson 1948, 91.
- 7 cf. Thomas Reid, *An Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense*, in: *Thomas Reid, Works* (ed.: William Hamilton), Edinburgh/ London: MacLachlan and Stewart/ Longman etc. 1863 (6. ed.), I, 204ff.
- 8 cf. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (ed.: Peter H. Nidditch), Oxford: Clarendon 1978, b. I, p. I, s. 1. Cf. against Hume's theory of ideas: Reid, *Inquiry*, 96, 103, 131, 140ff., 204ff.; Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, in: *Thomas Reid, Works* (ed.: William Hamilton), Edinburgh/ London: MacLachlan and Stewart/ Longman etc. 1863 (6. ed.), I, 225ff., 254ff., 262ff., 292f., 298ff., 446; Reid, Letter to Lord Kames (1.12.1778), in: Ian Ross (ed.), *Unpublished Letters of Thomas Reid to Lord Kames 1762-1782*, in: *Texas Studies in Literature and Language* 7, 1965, 36ff.; Reid, Excerpts, in: Fred S. Michael/ Emily Michael, *Reid's Hume: Remarks on Hume in some Early Logic Lectures of Reid*, *The Monist* 70, 1987, 520f.
- 9 cf. Reid, *Inquiry*, 95f., 102, 103f., 108f., 131f., 140ff., 205ff.

- 10 Reid, *Inquiry*, 132.
- 11 cf. Thomas Reid, Letter to Gregory, in: *Thomas Reid, Works* (ed.: William Hamilton), Edinburgh/ London: MacLachlan and Stewart/ Longman etc. 1863 (6. ed.), I, 88.
- 12 cf. Reid, *Inquiry*, 106; Reid, *Essays*, 225f., 256f., 292f., 298ff., 431f., 446.
- 13 cf. Reid, *Essays*, 368f., 373f. Cf. in a similar vein: John L. Austin, *Sense and Sensibilia* (ed.: Geoffrey J. Warnock), Oxford: Clarendon 1962; Willard van Orman Quine, *Word and Object*, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press 1960, 1ff.
- 14 cf. Reid, *Inquiry*, 106; Reid, *Essays*, 257.
- 15 cf. Priestley's critique: *Examination*, lxf.
- 16 Cf. also Reid's critique of Hume's "table argument" (cf. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (ed.: Peter H. Nidditch), Oxford: Clarendon 1975, 152) in the *Essays*, 302ff.
- 17 cf. Reid, *Inquiry*, 106, 119ff., *Essays*, 258f., 259f., 414f.
- 18 cf. Descartes' dreaming argument in the *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, in: René Descartes, *Oeuvores de Descartes* (ed.: Charles Adam & Paul Tannery), Paris: Cerf, 1907-1913, VII 19ff.
- 19 cf. Reid, *Inquiry*, 183f.; *Essays*, 233f., 334ff., 447f. Reid stresses that we don't have reason to doubt the reliability of our cognitive faculties (cf. *Essays*, 259).
- 20 Reid, *Essays*, 447.
- 21 William P. Alston, "Thomas Reid on Epistemic Principles", *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 2, 1985, 436ff., 448, holds that Reid's reliabilism is an important contribution to current epistemology. Cf. also Roger D. Gallie, *Thomas Reid and 'The Way of Ideas'*, Dordrecht etc.: Kluwer 1989, 223ff.
- 22 Reid offers different lists of the principles of common sense: cf. *Essays*, 231ff., 441ff., 452ff., 454ff.
- 23 Reid, *Essays*, 230. Cf. also: Reid, *Inquiry*, 100f., 108, 127; *Essays*, 230ff.; Of Constitution, in: James McCosh, *The Scottish Philosophy, Biographical, Expository, Critical, from Hutcheson to Hamilton*, New York: Robert Carter and Brothers 1875, 475.
- 24 cf. Reid, *Inquiry*, 130; *Essays*, 230, 422, 425, 435; "Curâ Primâ: Of Common Sense", in: David Fate Norton, Appendix: Thomas Reid's Curâ Primâ on Common Sense, in: Louise Marcil-Lacoste, *Claude Buffier and Thomas Reid. Two Common Sense Philosophers*, Kingston and Montréal: McGill, Queen's University Press 1982, 188; *The Philosophical Orations of Thomas Reid* (ed.: D.D. Todd), Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press 1989, 49f.
- 25 cf. Reid, *Inquiry*, 130.
- 26 Reid, *Inquiry*, 130.
- 27 cf. Reid, *Inquiry*, 108, 128, 130, 183f., *Essays*, 416, 434; *Curâ Primâ*, 187; *Orations*, 49. Cf. critically: Priestley, *Examination*, 26f., 121. Oswald objects to the "argument from constitution" (cf. James Oswald, *An Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion*, Edinburgh: A. Kincaid and J. Bell 1766, I, 112f., II, 18, 20ff.); he opposes the naturalism which Reid shares with Hume.
- 28 cf. Of Constitution, 475; *Essays on the Active Powers of Man*, in: *Thomas Reid*,

THE SCOTTISH PRAGMATIST?

- Works* (ed.: William Hamilton), Edinburgh/ London: MacLachlan and Stewart/ Longman etc. 1863 (6. ed.), II, 676. Cf., however, Priestley, *Examination*, 124f.
- 29 Priestley, *Examination*, 26.
- 30 cf. Priestley, *Examination*, 5, 116.
- 31 Priestley, *Examination*, 121 (Priestley's emphasis); cf. 26f., 121ff., 128.
- 32 cf. *Inquiry*, 183f.
- 33 Priestley, *Examination*, 121ff. does not realize this aspect of Reid's position. Cf. *Inquiry*, 183f., 130 (but cf. also *Orations*, 49).
- 34 The only other philosopher who combined a common sense approach with reservations about common sense truths might be Peirce (cf. *Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers* (eds.: Charles Hartshorne/ Paul Weiss), Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1934, 5.444f., 5.451, 5.514).
- 35 This leads to Kant's project of a "transcendental deduction of the categories": cf. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (KrV), A 84ff./ B 116ff.; A 95ff./ B 129ff. It is interesting to see that in the context of describing the purpose of the transcendental deduction Kant distances himself from common sense-philosophy: cf. KrV, A 232f./ B 285f.
- 36 cf. Thomas Reid, Letter to Hume (18.3.1763), in: *Thomas Reid, Works* (ed.: William Hamilton), Edinburgh/ London: MacLachlan and Stewart/ Longman etc. 1863 (6. ed.), I, 91f.; *An Abstract to the Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense by Thomas Reid, D.D.*, in: David Fate Norton, 'Reid's Abstract of the Inquiry into the Human Mind', in: Stephen F. Barker/ Tom L. Beauchamp (eds.), *Thomas Reid: Critical Interpretations* (Philosophical Monographs), Philadelphia 1976, 128.
- 37 cf. Reid, *Essays*, 466.
- 38 cf. Reid, *Of Constitution*. It is interesting to note how Reid explains the difference between analytical and synthetical principles: It depends on whether "the predicate of the proposition is ... contained in the subject" (Reid, *Of Constitution*, 475). Kant later gives the same explanation (cf. KrV, A 6/ B 10). There are further remarkable parallels between Reid and Kant. Both attribute a fundamental status to the principle of causality which they both describe in a similar way (cf. Reid, *Of Constitution*, 475; *Essays*, 455ff.; Kant, KrV, A 80/ B 106; A 189; B 232. Furthermore, in *Curâ primâ*, 200ff. Reid describes common sense as the faculty to apply general concepts like identity, number, quality to objects; one could call this Reid's conception of the "categories". Finally, Reid distinguishes between the sensual matter and the rational form of the notions of common sense (cf. *Curâ primâ*, 204f.).
- 39 The influence of Scottish common sense philosophy especially on Kant is investigated by Manfred Kuehn, *Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768-1800. A Contribution to the History of Critical Philosophy*, Kingston and Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1987, 167ff., 175, 186.
- 40 *ibid.*, 248.
- 41 cf. KrV, A 232f./ B 285f.
- 42 cf. David Fate Norton, *From Moral Sense to Common Sense: An Essay on the*

- 43 *Development of Scottish Common Sense Philosophy, 1700-1765*, unpubl. PhD-Diss.,
University of California, San Diego 1966, 189ff. Norton holds that Hume has
also anticipated and refuted Reid's common sense philosophy (cf. *ibid.*, 235).
- 44 cf. Hume, *Treatise*, 183f., 187, 218, 263ff., 657; Hume, *Enquiry*, 41, 151, 160.
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Mind, Edinburgh: William Tait (16. ed.), 1846,
II, 89; cf. 89f.
- 45 Reid, *Inquiry*, 201.
- 46 cf. Nicholas Rescher, "On First Principles and their Legitimation", in: *Allgemeine
Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 1 (2), 1976, 5f.; John Kekes, "A New Defence of
Common Sense", *American Philosophical Quarterly* 16, 1979, 119ff.
- 47 cf. Reid, *Inquiry*, 184.
- 48 cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Über Gewißheit*, in: *Ludwig Wittgenstein, Werkausgabe*,
Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, vol. 8, 205.
- 49 James, too, relates pragmatism to common sense: cf. William James, *Pragmatism*,
Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press 1975 83ff.
- 50 cf. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 5.444ff., 5.505ff.
- 51 cf. *ibid.*, 5.438ff., 5.497ff., 5.502ff.
- 52 cf. *ibid.*, 5.445, 5.498.
- 53 cf. *ibid.*, 5.515.
- 54 cf. *ibid.*, 5.444f.
- 55 cf. *ibid.*, 5.451, 5.514.
- 56 cf. Willard van Orman Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in: Willard van
Orman Quine, *From a Logical Point of View* (2. ed.), Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard
University Press 1961, 43. On Quine's pragmatism cf. *ibid.*, 46.
- 57 cf. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 5.451, 5.498.
- 58 cf. Wittgenstein, *Über Gewißheit*.
- 59 I would like to thank several people who have commented upon my paper:
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