


Developing a Tool for Analyzing Structure-Related Elements Such as Discourse Markers in  
Casual Conversation

Swarthmore College Department of Linguistics  
Carmen Barron  
Linguistics Thesis  
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## 1.0 Introduction

The area of interest in this paper<sup>1</sup> is the analysis of casual conversation,<sup>2</sup> specifically, how to better analyze structure-related elements such as Discourse Markers in casual conversation. This is a type of Conversational Analysis (CA), which is a specialized area of Discourse Analysis involving spoken (as opposed to written) discourse. The features typical to conversation are quite sensitive to the conversation's end function<sup>3</sup>, and as casual conversation typically employs more interaction between participants than would a conversation whose end function is to meet some pre-determined end, in this paper I address casual conversation as a mode for analyzing Discourse Markers.<sup>4</sup>

In this paper I look at the function of Discourse Markers as put forth by earlier linguistic studies, and how Discourse Markers function within the casual conversation discourse structure and the organization of conversation. Given Discourse Markers' structuring function, I propose that in order to adequately analyze them or any other structure-related elements of casual conversation, the researcher needs a tool which better represents the actual structure of spoken discourse and organization of conversation. Without a representation of the organizational information used by participants during actual conversation, researchers lack information vital to the conversation's discourse structure, resulting in a disparity of comprehension between

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<sup>1</sup> I would like to offer acknowledgment and my sincere thanks to the following people for their inspiration, instruction, advice and aid in this project. I could not have written this thesis without them; however, they are by no means responsible for any mess I've made of their council: Elena Cuffari, Ted Fernald, Melinda Kleppinger, the LDC, Alexis Mitchell, Donna Jo Napoli, Leslie Tran and Suzanne Wagner.

<sup>2</sup> The vocabulary used regarding analyzing conversation is highly irregular; while some sources use "Conversational Analysis," other sources use another term. Hereafter, "Conversational Analysis," unless used in quoted material or specifically explained otherwise, refers to analyzing conversation as set forth by this paper's proposed model.

<sup>3</sup> For example, in a casual conversation participants speak to build a common understanding, but in a bank, participants speak in order to best fulfill the pre-determined end of meeting their banking needs

<sup>4</sup> From June 2002 – March 2004 I worked at the LDC part-time as a Linguistic Researcher/Annotator. The majority of my tasks there allowed me to work with transcribed spoken discourse, and my main assigned project, MetaData, involved the research and identification of Discourse Markers. From my experiences at the LDC, the most frequent usage of DMs occurred in the casual settings, and there were noticeably more DMs used in telephone data, however statistics illustrating this difference are not available. I would suggest using casual telephone conversational data in addition to casual face-to-face conversational data for future analysis of DMs. Herein, I restrict my analysis to casual face-to-face conversation.

comprehension of actual spoken discourse and comprehension of transcribed spoken discourse (the former being much more easily understood than the latter). To lessen this disparity, I propose the addition of key conversational organization information to spoken discourse transcripts, and develop the *Structured Transcript* as a means of so doing. The *Structured Transcript* provides important conversational organization information by means of visual representation within the transcript. By giving visual representation to the methods of conversational organization—specifically *Event*, *Speaker* and *Turn*—the *Structured Transcript* provides adequate information display for the analysis of Discourse Markers and other structure-related aspects of spoken discourse.

### 1.1 Data

The data for this paper draws from the *Corpus of Spoken American English (CSAE)* as begun by the University of California, Santa Barbara and completed by the Linguistic Data Consortium (Philadelphia, PA). I have selected file sbc0005, “A Book About Death” for analysis, as it is a casual conversation between two speakers with little background noise. Other data files available in the corpus feature multiple speakers in a variety of situations, many with much background noise.

As obtained from the Linguistic Data Consortium, the corpus includes .wav files of the data, as well as transcriptions of each file. Transcription notation conventions can be found in Appendix I: Transcription Symbols of CSAE below. For the sake of my own explanations, I have added relevant notations to the data that follows, and these additions are explained within the paper, as per appearance.

## 2.0 Spoken Discourse

Though both spoken and written discourse are examples of cohesive bodies of human communication, their basic difference of medium creates different organizational needs, specifically with respect to response times within specific types of spoken and written discourse. Conversation (a type of spoken discourse) is by its nature a faster mode of communication than is writing, and this speed allows participants greater amounts of interaction than does written communication (Biber 1988, 21). Stubbs characterized the differences between written and spoken communication in a single sentence, “much written language is standard, formal, planned, edited, public and non-interactive, whereas spoken language is typically casual, spontaneous, private and face-to-face” (qtd. in Lenk 1987, 18).

It is important to note that the above characterization is between *much* written language and *typically casual* spoken language. Though the difference in medium does keep written language from being as wholly interactive as casual spoken language, forms of written language (those outside Stubbs’ characterization) can quite easily mimic spoken language in its less formal forms.<sup>5</sup> Notes surreptitiously exchanged between students during class are a form of written language, though as they are usually products of prohibited spoken conversation (prohibited by the interruptive aspect of speaking casually in a classroom setting), such notes, though written, tend to be of an interactive, casual conversation-like nature. Students’ notes to one another in class is a form of written communication which, like several others, is used as an alternative to actually *talking* (which may have whatever situational prohibitions due to the noise produced,

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<sup>5</sup> The written forms referred to in Stubbs’ characterization are more formal written forms of communication, such as formal letters, essays, proposals, etc. Such formal forms of written communication, with their intentions of presentation, argumentation, etc., are not interactive and therefore are utterly different from casual spoken language, which is by nature interactive. One should note that formal spoken language can have the same clearly-defined structural qualities as can formal written language, for example logical arguments, presentations, speeches, etc., and are likewise different from casual spoken language. In this paper I address the structure of *casual spoken language* only.

etc.). Yet, because of the students' physical proximity to one another, their exchange of written communiqué is usually rapid, allowing it to be quite interactive (unlike traditional letter writing). If the students exchanging notes misunderstand something that is written, it can easily and quickly be clarified in a few pen strokes, while in the next few pen strokes they begin writing to one another about something new altogether. Similarly, during casual conversation, if a statement is misunderstood, it can easily and quickly be clarified in a few words, while in the next few words another statement about something new altogether is made. Simply put, it seems that written communication begins to resemble spoken communication more closely as the time required to exchange communiqué decreases.

My observation is further supported by certain types of written communication made possible in the past decade. The time required to write a message (such as a letter), combined with the delivery time, as well as the recipient's response/return time, means that written communication typically has a large time requirement for the exchange of communiqué. For this reason, participants in written communication, in the interest of maximizing clarity and minimizing confusion (and cost of delivery), are usually quite careful to clearly structure their written communications.<sup>6</sup> However, modern communications technology and the Internet have allowed written communication to structurally resemble spoken communication more closely. By granting an (almost) instantaneous exchange of written communiqué (which was previously impossible), technology has in effect made the difference between written and spoken communication one of purely medium, and not one of lag time. By granting a rapid rate of

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<sup>6</sup> The type of structure utilized in lag-time ridden written communication is typically one of formal writing. Though many different approaches and styles to formal writing exist, perhaps one of the more recognized forms in English written discourse is well-characterized by Strunk and White in *The Elements of Style*, "Writing, to be effective, must follow closely the thoughts of the writer, but not necessarily in the order in which those thoughts occur. This calls for a scheme of procedure" (Strunk & White, 15). This is the basic premise of formal written discourse—it does not necessarily follow the flow of thought, and can be altered for the sake of easy comprehension quite easily.



exchange to written communication, technology has given certain forms of written communication an interactive and spontaneous nature previously prohibited by lag time concerns. With this interactive and spontaneous capability, participants in technology-aided written communication, much like surreptitious classroom note exchangers, create written communication discourses structured in the context of rapidity and spontaneity, and not in the context of the need for a clearly delineated structure.

Hence, it seems the difference between the written language and spoken language compared in Stubbs' statement is one of immediacy: written language of the (earlier) slow rate of exchange, and spoken language with its quick exchange. Although I observe that technology has allowed written language spontaneity previously prohibited, and this spontaneity produces written discourse that structurally resembles spoken discourse. I do not address such technology-aided written discourses. In this paper, I address the structural aspects of casual conversation in spoken language only.

Under demands of rapidity and spontaneity, participants of casual spoken language must employ different methods of structure and organization while speaking in order to maintain a mutual understanding of the flow of ideas in the conversation. In the following example of casual conversation, note how the topic changes flawlessly, with no introduction or transition, and with very little hesitation.<sup>7</sup> Then, with neither clear transition nor explicit indication of an upcoming shift in topic, the topic changes back to the original topic. In spoken discourse, since the communication occurs on-the-spot with no hard copy, the content exists only in the participants' memory, and alterations must be made retroactively, rather than at point of error.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> For discussion of the actual topic shifts in Data Sample 1, please see Section 1.2, Quick Discussion of Topics in Data Sample 1.

<sup>8</sup> In the above-mentioned forms of technology-aided written communication, usually participants do not have the ability to edit their contributions to the discourse, though they can re-read them. In online chat rooms and in instant

<u>Topic B</u> →570.60	575.18	DARRYL:	... (H) What if.
	575.18		What .. if=.
<u>Response</u> →576.13	577.13	PAMELA:	(Hx) <u>Unhu=nh</u> .
<u>Topic B</u> →577.13	579.17	DARRYL:	What if worrying about that,
DM, Topic A →579.17	579.73	PAMELA:	% <u>See</u> ,
	579.73		this is what you told !Deven.
DM, Topic B →581.12	581.37	DARRYL:	<u>well</u> ,
	581.37		what if worrying about that,
	583.04		has got in the way=,
	584.40		... gotten in the way,
	586.16		of you making positive choices for
	586.16		yourself in your life.
	589.72		... (H) Instead of just worrying
			about,
	593.22		w- that you're he=re,
	594.42		... and making the best out of it.
<u>Topic C</u> →597.08	599.65	PAMELA:	... Being here is=,
	599.65		.. is so illusive sometimes.
	601.73		... <u>I mean</u> .. illusionary.
DM, Topic D →601.73	604.24	DARRYL:	... Those are two different words=,
<u>Topic C/D</u> →604.24	606.88		and they mean two different things.
	606.88	PAMELA:	<u>Well</u> it's illusionary.
DM, Topic D →608.23	609.40		... I take back what I said about
	609.40		@illusive,
	611.90	DARRYL:	@@
(laughter) 611.90	612.15	PAMELA:	(H) [00 (H) 0000]000 (H)
(laughter) 612.15	615.88	DARRYL:	[Y .. you may be elusive].
<u>Topic C/D</u> →612.96	614.66		(H)
	615.88		... <u>well</u> ,
DM →616.13	617.07	PAMELA:	Mm,
<u>Response</u> →617.07	617.52	DARRYL:	<u>yeah but .. but .. but=</u> ,
DM, Topic B →617.52	619.12		% to me the whole point is is,
	619.12		... you have no idea,
	620.72		what happens before or after.
	625.17		... You have no idea.
	627.17		... You can read books about it,
	630.53		and you can .. (H) talk about it,
	633.56		... but the most pragmatic thing to
	635.56		do is,
	638.75		to just ... live it.
	638.75		

(CSAE: A Book About Death)

### Data Sample 1: Changing Topic and Discourse Markers in Casual Conversation<sup>1</sup>

text messaging, for example, once the message is sent it appears on the computer screen, visible to all. The electronically-sent text is no longer editable, and participants must alter their communications by-the-moment, rather than by simply editing the text. In this aspect, too, technology-aided written communication resembles casual spoken communication.

## 2.1 Quick Discussion of Topics in Data Sample 1

The above Data Sample 1 illustrates the smooth transition to and from topics A, B, C and D between Darryl and Pamela. I have determined these topics by reading through and listening to the conversation in its entirety, and then grouping utterances by their commonalities. These commonalities are often phrases that are repeated by one of the participants for emphasis, to regain control of the floor after an interruption, etc. Often utterances are grouped because of a common pronoun referent or antecedent, which if correctly traced, makes it clear that utterances' contents augment one another. Here I make a quick discussion of the topics within Data Sample 1 for two reasons: first, to begin establishing through example what *Topic*<sup>9</sup> in conversation is, and second, to illustrate with real data the spontaneity and rapidity with which conversation topic changes, and how despite this spontaneity and rapidity, participants manage to converse with little hesitation.

Topic A in Data Sample 1 refers to something which Darryl told Devan (referenced in this conversation, but never a participant therein). It can be argued that Pamela sees a relationship between Topic A (what Darryl presumably told Devan at an earlier time) and Topic B, because she uses the pronoun "this," with likely reference to Darryl's immediately previous remark, followed by "is what you told Devan." However, no other associations of the type are made in either Data Sample 1 or the larger data file from which it derives, and the relationship Pamela presumably sees between Topic A and Topic B is not pursued. With this lack of conclusive connective information, I have kept Topic A and B separate in Data Sample 1.

Topic B in Data Sample 1 refers to what Darryl is trying to explain to and understand about Pamela. From the larger file sbc0005 (from which Data Sample 1 is taken), it is clear that Darryl is trying to figure out why Pamela is preoccupied with death. In Data Sample 1, Darryl

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<sup>9</sup> For further explanation of *Topic*, please refer to Section 3.1.3.

refers to death as “it” and “that” (for more clarity regarding Darryl’s use of pronouns, I advise the reader to read over the conversation in its entirety, in Appendix IV). Throughout sbc0005 Darryl tries to understand why Pamela is reading a book about death, or more specifically, why she has a preoccupation with death. Topic B accounts for utterances with regard to Pamela’s preoccupation with death.

Topic C in Data Sample 1 begins when Pamela refers to “being here” as “illusive.” At the beginning of her turn from 597.08 through 601.73, she is talking about “being here,” but at 601.73, Pamela realizes an error in her word choice and self-corrects. Pamela introduces Topic D in speaking to her error in word choice rather than to “being here,” making Topic D a topic accounting for utterances regarding Pamela’s word error between “illusive” and “illusionary.”

At 604.24 – 608.38 Darryl continues with Topic D by talking about Pamela’s word choice rather than about “being here.” However it is not clear whether Darryl is speaking solely to the words’ meanings in the context of Pamela’s “being here,” or the words’ meanings as per his understanding, regardless of how they may describe Pamela’s “being here”—for this reason, Darryl’s utterance falls into both Topics C and D.

Pamela addresses the problem of her misspeak posed by Darryl—that they are “two different words and they mean two different things,” and specifies her desired word choice, clearly speaking to Topic D. After a period of laughter, at 612.96 – 614.66 Darryl speaks again to the topic of Pamela’s earlier misspeak, this time playing on the morphological similarities of her earlier word choices, and jokingly supposing that Pamela herself may be well-embodied by yet another morphologically-similar word, “elusive.” In this wordplay, it appears

Darryl uses “elusive” to refer back to Topics C and D through its sound, while using the topic of Pamela’s misspeak (Topic D) to suggest she meant “elusive” all along.

After the topic of Pamela’s word choice has been exhausted, at 617.52 – 640.05 Darryl again brings the conversation back to his understanding and suggestions regarding Pamela’s preoccupation with death, Topic B.

If while reading the transcript in Data Sample 1 you also consider the timestamp, and therefore the timing of the utterances relative to one another, you will notice that there is very little hesitation around topic changes, indicating immediate recognition of what is being spoken about. Yet, neither Darryl nor Pamela explicitly states intention to shift from one topic to another, nor do they state their intent to return to a previous topic. Somehow, without the strict structure of written discourse, Darryl and Pamela mutually structure their spoken discourse such that both understand the structure while neither explicitly addresses the structure.

## 2.2 Brief Introduction to Discourse Markers<sup>10</sup>

In Data Sample 1 above, in addition to marking the change of topic, I have made the notation DM to the left of transcribed lines containing double-underlined words. I use the notation DM to note that the words I have double underlined are *Discourse Markers*. DMs have been moderately studied, though often given different names, functions and patterns of occurrence. Generally, DMs are accepted as words or phrases that communicate underlying structure in spoken discourse. In this paper, I do not attempt to define what DMs are nor to offer an exhaustive listing of words usable as DMs. Here, my primary goal is to show that DMs are a

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<sup>10</sup> Here I briefly introduce DMs to give the reader a basis of knowledge for the proceeding argument. Please see Section 4 for a much more in-depth discussion of DMs.

class of words that grant structure to spoken discourse, and therefore to study DMs, one must consider the structure of spoken discourse in the analysis.

Lawrence C. Schourup posits that *discourse particles* help conversation participants to manage three “worlds” of conversational activity: the private world of current disclosable thought, the shared world into which participants place conversational elements, in view of one another, and the “other world, containing the disclosable but otherwise invisible thinking of some co-participants(s)” (Schourup 1983, 143). Schourup’s approach basically treats DMs as “phonological expressions of what kind of thinking process is taking place in the speaker’s mind at a particular moment during utterance production” (Lenk 1998b, 41). This approach, while interesting for those studying utterances which cue underlying thinking processes, such as in the Logico-Philosophic<sup>11</sup> approach to conversational analysis, does not address the utterances’ function(s).

In Schiffrin’s well-known study of DMs she explores the pragmatic functions of DMs. Unlike Schourup’s analysis which makes DMs a sort of catch-all classification for utterances that may somehow indicate a speaker’s thinking process, Schiffrin’s model looks at certain DMs that “all apply between immediately adjacent utterances and indicate how these are connected with each other” (Lenk 1998b, 43). Schiffrin’s model is dependent upon the five interconnected “planes of talk” she identifies. By Schiffrin’s analysis, DMs have roles within each of these planes of talk, and furthermore DMs have “a function within the overall integration of discourse as a system” (Schiffrin 1987, 313). Schiffrin’s analysis addresses only DMs that create *local coherence*, or that integrate the planes of talk of strictly adjacent utterances.

In her criticism of Schiffrin’s analysis, Redeker simplifies the five planes of talk to three, since only the three she identifies always co-occur within conversation, and the other two have

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<sup>11</sup> See Section 1.5.3 for more discussion of the Logico-Philosophic approach.

but sporadic occurrence. Redeker models how *discourse operators* have “the primary function of bringing to the listener’s attention a particular kind of linkage of the upcoming utterance with the immediate discourse context” (Redeker 1991, 1168). Through Redeker’s definition of the three planes of talk, discourse operators show linkage not only *sequential* relationships between utterances, but also *ideational* and *rhetorical* relationships between adjacent utterances.

From these key studies, it is clear that DMs are words or phrases that communicate some sort of underlying structure of spoken discourse. Given the properties of spoken discourse (as opposed to written discourse), particularly its spontaneous and face-to-face nature, DMs have a clear structuring utility to both listening and speaking conversational participants. Schourup’s study shows how DMs can reference non-spoken information, and in so doing coordinate multiple planes of talk between conversation participants with the utterance of DMs in the form of single words and small phrases. Schiffrin’s and Redeker’s studies, despite their differences, share the core idea that DMs convey information regarding how the DM-laden utterance relates to utterances immediately before and/or after. By conveying this adjacent-utterance relationship information, DMs convey *local coherence* relations between utterances.


### **2.2.1 Local Coherence**

*Local coherence* refers to how sequential/adjacent elements of a conversation relate to and build from one another logically—that is, the manner in which chronologically adjacent utterances in a conversation, through their relationships and proximity to one another, work together to provide each with more meaning through context. According to work by Schiffrin and Redeker (among others), a DM, by providing pragmatic information regarding how its parent sentence relates to utterances in the same locality, function to build this *local coherence*.

DMs can build local coherence in a variety of ways. A DM may convey some sort of causative relationship with regard to the content of the utterances, such as **A:** *I hurt my finger.* **B:** *So do you want a Band-Aid?* They may convey some sort of correlation, such as **A:** *I'm going home.* **B:** *Well, it's already 2:30AM.* They may convey a positive relationship, such as **A:** *This soup is hot.* **B:** *Yeah, it's really good.* They may convey a negative relationship, such as **A:** *I love writing papers.* **B:** *No, you're a masochist.* Fully exploring the types of relationships conveyable through DMs is beyond the scope of this paper, suffice to say DMs provide important information that orients utterances local to one another, and in so doing, DMs provide structure in spoken discourse.

### 2.3 The Approaches to Analyzing Casual Conversation

Since verbalized conversation is the most common form of human communication, many different approaches to analyzing spoken discourse exist, each tailored to analyze the portions of conversational data that best illuminate a specific field of interest. Below is a chart illustrating five broad approaches to analyzing casual conversation.





*Figure 1: Approaches to Analyzing Casual Conversation*

(Eggins & Slade 1997, 24)

### 2.3.1 Ethnomethodological Approach

The term “Conversational Analysis” was coined by pioneering sociologists, not linguists, who first brought conversation into the lens of academic research. As put by Sharrock and Anderson (1987), “the understanding of everyday talk” would allow them to “[see] the sense of ordinary activities” and thereby be “able to see what people are doing and saying” (qtd. in Eggins & Slade 1997, 25). Precedents set by sociologists via the ethnomethodological approach continue to shape the study of conversation. In *A Simplistic Systematics for the Organization of Turn-Taking for Conversation* (hereafter simply *Systematics*), the sociologists Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson accounted for fourteen “grossly apparent facts” of conversation.<sup>12</sup> Given these facts, analysts “modeled conversation as a generative mechanism, designed to fulfill two basic functions”—speakers’ ability to discern appropriate speaker role changes, and determination of the next speaker (Eggins & Slade 199, 25).

Sociologists’ ethnomethodological approach has two large problems, the first being that the approach neglects to “relate aspects of conversational organization to aspects of the organization of language as a whole,” or more simply put, it does not incorporate linguistic research findings into a topic clearly influenced by language mechanics. By failing to address the relationship of their *Systematics* to the mechanics of language, the study by Sacks, *et al.* loses its potential to be quantitatively analyzed. Though *Systematics* presents the idea of compelling patterns in speech, the proof of the existence of these patterns is dependent upon “being able to describe the co-occurrence of linguistic patterns, involving rhythm, intonation, grammatical

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<sup>12</sup> I will return to these observations later in the paper.

structure and semantics,”—an endeavor which all but requires the incorporation of linguistic research findings (Eggins & Slade 1997, 32).

Second, with respect to turn-taking systematics, the sociologists’ approach only allowed the analysis of aspects of turn-taking occurring with immediate proximity to the turn in question, which precludes the analysis of turns clearly related to one another content-wise, yet out-of-synch chronologically (or, *chronologically segmented interactions*). This approach also precludes the analysis of turns and their causes and/or effects beyond their immediate proximity—while *Systematics* looks closely at how (for example) Speaker I’s utterance influences or is influenced by Speaker II’s utterance immediately before or after I’s utterance, the method fails to analyze those influences which may occur with more than one degree of chronological separation. This is to say, the approach in *Systematics* is limited to analyzing turn-taking phenomena on a *local* level, and fails to address the *global* effect turns have in the discourse (Eggins & Slade 1997, 25-32).

### **2.3.2 Sociolinguistic Approach**

Sociolinguistic approaches to analyzing conversation address the ethnomethodological approach’s linguistic shortcoming and analyze “the use of language in the social contexts of everyday life” (Eggins & Slade 1997, 33). Though there are several different sociolinguistic perspectives, they share the view that language use is sensitive to social context and that social relationships can be affected by language use. Hence, the sociolinguistic approach strives to illuminate the relationship between specific language functions and specific social functions (Eggins & Slade 1997, 33-40).

### **2.3.3 Logico-Philosophic Approach**

Logico-Philosophic approaches to analysis of spoken discourse focuses on the interpretation of utterances in conversation rather than the production or function of utterances in a conversation. In the logico-philosophic approach, how language functions within the discourse is of less interest than the suppositions and inferences which may be drawn from the utterance's content and from the fact that it was in fact made. Although several perspectives to the logico-philosophic approach exist, Grice's Cooperative principle is a highly influential perspective (Eggins & Slade 1997, 40-43).

### **2.3.4 Structural-Functional Approach**

Structural-functional approaches to conversation seek to "describe conversation as a distinctive, highly organized level of language" (Taylor & Cameron 1987, qtd. in Eggins & Slade 1997, 43). These approaches attempt to organize conversation by other methods, such as turns, acts, moves, etc. In so doing, discourse becomes recognized as a level of organization in of itself, distinct from already recognized levels such as grammar and phonology. By defining broader levels of conversational organization, the structural-functional approach allows for a more general type of conversational structure than does the ethnomethodological approach. This more general type of conversational structure in turn provides for looser associations in order to establish conversational relevance, which better accounts for (what appear to the observer as) vague references between participants in casual conversation (Eggins & Slade 1997, 43-58).

### **2.3.5 Social-Semiotic Approach**

The Social-Semiotic approach looks to analyze casual conversation because "language provides the most finely articulated means for a nuanced registration of differences in power in

social hierarchical structures, both as a static system and in process” (Kress 1985, qtd. in Eggins & Slade 1997, 60). This approach looks at *why* interactions happen, *how* we study these interactions and *what* the socio-cultural and historical context of the interaction are. Broadly speaking, the social-semiotic approach to analyzing spoken discourse looks to define the underlying social causes and influences of language use, and how this language in turn causes and influences social interaction (Eggins & Slade 1997, 58-66).

#### **2.4 Approach Method of This Paper**

The breadth of these approaches makes it clear that for successful communication, participants in a conversation must simultaneously manipulate and account for the other conversation participant’s manipulation of a multitude of factors. I assume in this paper that all these factors affect speakers’ behavior in a conversation and their methods of structuring the conversation. Though I draw primarily from the Ethnomethodological and Structural-Functional approaches, I do not limit my analysis to the confines of these approaches. Further, I am attempting to illustrate that speakers implement unique means of structuring spoken discourse, for example, using DMs. In order to analyze aspects of spoken discourse structuring, such as the use of DMs, it is vital that researchers have the tools necessary for an analysis of structure in spoken discourse. These tools are in the form of adequate transcription of spoken discourse, as well as information regarding conversation participants’ backgrounds that allows the researcher to understand coherence relations utilized in the conversation by participants.

#### **3.0 Organization of Conversation**

By its very existence, conversation has innate qualities of organization. Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson addressed these qualities in their proposed conversational organization model,

*Systematics*. As many since them, the authors recognized speaker turns as the basic unit of organization for a conversation, since turns “[appear] to have an appropriate sort of general abstractness and local particularization potential” (S, S, J 1974, 700). They cite the following “grossly apparent facts”<sup>13</sup> as proof that turns function to organize conversation, as these facts are largely true of any conversation:

- 1) Speaker-change recurs or at least occurs
- 2) Overwhelmingly, one party talks at a time
- 3) Occurrences of more than one speaker at a time are common, but brief
- 4) Transitions (from one turn to the next) with no gap and no overlap are common. Together with transitions characterized by slight gap or slight overlap, they make up the vast majority of transitions.
- 5) Turn order is not fixed, but varies
- 6) Turn size is not fixed, but varies
- 7) Length of conversation is not specified in advance
- 8) What parties say is not specified in advance
- 9) Relative distribution of turns is not specified in advance
- 10) Number of parties can vary
- 11) Talk can be continuous or discontinuous
- 12) Turn-allocation techniques are obviously used. A current speaker may select a next speaker (as when he addresses a question to another party); or parties may self-select in starting to talk
- 13) Various ‘turn-constructural units’ are employed: e.g., turns can be projectedly ‘one word long,’ or they can be sentential in length
- 14) Repair mechanisms exist for dealing with turn-taking error and violation; e.g., if two parties find themselves talking at the same time, one of them will stop prematurely, thus repairing the trouble.

(S, S & J, 1974, 700-701)

### 3.1 Implemented Methods of Organization of Conversation

The above observations indicate that content of a conversation is organized using several different methods, simultaneously. I say “method” rather than “unit” because I do not mean to suggest cutting conversation into pieces by the conventions outlined below. Rather, I suggest methods of analyzing conversation in the context of a specific property. This paper assumes that these methods of organization are *Event*, *Speaker*, *Topic* and *Turn*, as set forth below.

<sup>13</sup> These observations are generally true, but do have exceptions, particularly observation 14. Participants in spoken discourse are not necessarily as civil with one another as implied by 14. If two parties are talking at the same time, rather than one stopping prematurely to keep from talking at the same time as the other, the interaction can quite easily escalate to both parties shouting at once, trying to be heard by the other.

### 3.1.1 Event

When people converse with one another, they have a recollection of countless previous conversations they have had, either with their current conversant or with another. Often, people's ideas and understandings change from one conversation to another, and when people talk about the same thing on different occasions, there is a high likelihood that a mention of something on one occasion informs its mention on a different occasion. For example, if two people have lunch with one another every Monday at the same cafe, and each time they have lunch, they talk about the cars parked outside the café, it is highly likely that the mention of a car during their conversation on the tenth lunch meeting will be related to the mention of a car during one of the previous nine lunch meetings. It is also possible that the mention during the tenth lunch meeting is related to the mention of a car during any previous interaction they have had with regards to cars, with one another *or with someone else entirely*.

*Event* is a method that organizes/indicates the conversation's occurrence in time and space. In any *Event*, X number of content utterers will discuss Y topic(s) for Z period of time. One *Event* cannot be another, and *Events* do not (typically) overlap. This allows for the content in one *Event* to reference the content of another. The potential reference of one *Event* within the content of a different *Event* adds an additional level to relevance and coherence in discourse, as it implies that relevance and coherence influence and are influenced by content in a conversation which occurs within *a completely different* time and space. Simply put, *Event* refers to the occurrence of a conversation. Just as while having a conversation, one may make mention of a previously-had conversation, and therefore, within one *Event*, a different *Event* may be referenced.

### 3.1.2 Speaker

When people converse with one another, they are well aware of who is saying what. Utterances from different people, generally speaking, sound different, as people have different voices. Likewise, (generally speaking) utterances come from physical bodies with a location and spatial relationship to other physical bodies, further allowing people to build an automatic awareness of from whom utterances come. Other than the simple awareness of utterance responsibility, in actual conversation, people have a working and evolving knowledge of the context of their conversant's utterances. The more people talk to and learn about one another, the more they understand what one another means in conversation, because the building amount of background knowledge acts to give context to utterances. Going back to my earlier example about two people meeting on Mondays for lunch, imagine that one of the people continually mentions how much he absolutely loves red cars, particularly foreign-made ones, and during one Monday he remarks "*That is my dream car!*" with regards to one of the cars outside. On this particular Monday, though he tells the other person that his dream car is outside, he never explicitly mentions that the car he is currently referring to is the red, foreign-made car that the second person sees parked outside the café. Yet, the second person can be understand which of the cars parked outside the café is the first person's favorite, because in the context of the background information accrued during prior interactions, the utterance, "That is my dream car," necessitates that the "dream car" is the red, foreign-made car parked outside, and not one of the others.

*Speaker* is a method which classifies utterances by content utterer, and assigns each classified utterance with the background information associated with that specific content utterer. Within the conversation, every utterance is made by one of the participating content utterers within the *Event*, i.e. one of the *Speakers*.

Organizing the utterances by *Speaker* helps determine turn sequence and pragmatic relations between utterances. Participants and observers of conversations derive pragmatic information based on outside-of-*Event* knowledge of that *Speaker*, and by assuming the same background information as that of its assigned *Speaker*, conversation content (utterances) acquires vital context.<sup>14</sup> By incorporating the background information solicited at the time of data collection (such as sex, age, occupation, etc.) into the organizational method *Speaker*, I am allowing the provided demographic information of linguistic research participants to inform *Speaker* background knowledge regarding a topic. Furthermore, while working with data, non-solicited details about the background of a *Speaker* are revealed in the conversation, such as level of education, special interests, etc. I summarily assign such information found within the utterance to *Speaker*, as this information also helps to inform the background knowledge a *Speaker* has. (For example, if *Speaker I* is listed as a woman, and in an *Event* she reveals she is a mother of three toddlers, her level of knowledge regarding motherhood is (presumably) higher than that of a non-parent. If *Speaker I* tends to relate topics to one another via motherhood-related themes, it is important that the researcher know the background knowledge of *Speaker I* is that of a mother of three toddlers. With this information in mind, researcher can more easily understand the coherence relations built moment-by-moment by *Speaker I* in the spoken discourse.)

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<sup>14</sup> In almost any conversational analysis, in addition to transcribed/recorded conversation, the relationship between conversational participants and their backgrounds is of great importance, because these factors affect individuals' language use. (Biber 1988, 29-30) Douglas Biber places this information into three separate component categories—conversation participants' roles, characteristics, social evaluation and relations—but for the purpose of the current study, attaching them all to the single organizational method *Speaker* suffices.



### 3.1.3 Topic

When people converse with one another, in a single conversation they typically talk about many different things. In the process of conversing, conversation participants speak more broadly or more specifically about different topics, and sometimes combine different topics or split a single topic into two more specific topics. Again, in the earlier example of two people talking over Monday lunch, always mentioning the cars parked outside, the cars parked outside are not necessarily the only topic of their conversation. The two may talk about what they are eating, which may lead to what their favorite thing to eat is. This may lead to the topic of “favorite things,” which would include for one speaker, blue cars, as well as whatever favorite food he mentions. There are the topics of favorites, of cars and of food, and these topics employ pieces of one another yet also have their own specific characteristics.

*Topic* is a method which organizes conversation content by specific topic. A topic may occur across several turns and multiple speakers, and appears in both consecutive and non-consecutive turn sequences. Often multiple Topics occur simultaneously, and Topics are picked up and dropped throughout a conversation by any or all Speakers. Topics in one Event often relate to Topics within another Event, hence conversation participants can make references to other Events via related Topics. (See related discussion of Event referencing in 2.1.1, above.)

### 3.1.4 Turn

When people converse with one another, it is clear when an utterance occurs relative to other utterances by simply listening to the order in which they occur. Likewise, it becomes clear which *Speaker* is responsible for an utterance by simply listening to the voice and locating from which physical body the utterance is coming. In spoken discourse, speakers (usually) take turns

in speaking, and knowing whose turn it is to speak means knowing 1) what utterance belongs to whom and 2) when that utterance occurs relative to other utterances.

*Turn* is a method which organizes conversation participants' utterances by chronological occurrence and utterer possession/responsibility (*Speaker*) within the *Event*. Assuming that conversation participants maintain Relevance, *Turns* usually relate to one another via both content and pragmatic information. *Turn* is different from *Speaker* in that the organizational level of *Speaker* simply assigns utterances to their responsible *Speaker*, while also associating the background information of the *Speaker* with the utterance. The organizational method of *Turn*, however, by combining *Speaker* information with *Event* information grants both chronological and contextual information to an utterance, thereby communicating content and pragmatic information necessary to the participants' ability to maintain Relevance. It is possible for more than one conversation participant to occupy a single *Turn*, and in these instances, both participants are collaboratively contributing to the completion of the communication meant to take place at that point of the *Event*.

### **3.2 Organizational Methods and the Analysis of Conversation**

*Event* and *Speaker* are means of organization determined by attributes and conditions of the utterances, *rather than* by what the speakers do to maneuver within the conversation. Once a conversation has started, it is implicitly decided that *then* and *there* is its *Event*. Once utterers engage in conversation with one another, it is clear that *they* are *Speakers*, and transcribing utterances and assigning them to correct *Speakers* is simply a task of identification. The two organizational methods addressed above are clearly identifiable and not the product of a fluid

collaborative effort of communication. They do not account for the actual mechanics—the constant interpretation, revision and development—which characterizes human conversation.

### 3.2.1 Topic, Turn, Relevance and Conversation

The methods of *Topic* and *Turn*, however, are methods of organization that are not as clearly identifiable as are *Event* and *Speaker*, because they do not have a fixed occurrence. *Topic*, with its development based in participants' ever-growing and evolving bank of knowledge during conversation, does not have a fixed occurrence. It is not clearly identifiable because with every new utterance in a spoken discourse, participants reinforce or change previous relationships they understood between *Topics*, or create new *Topics* to accommodate previously unconsidered information. Though participants in casual conversation organize the content of their spoken discourse by means of creation, elaboration and specification of *Topics*, the fact that these *Topics* are so malleable makes them difficult to clearly identify. Very often, a single utterance employs several *Topics*, and in this case, how does one identify those *Topics* individually, as well as in the context of the others? Though there may be some core aspect to a *Topic*, such as “cars” in the earlier example, over the course of but a few utterances a *Topic* acquires so many different possible avenues of development that identifying the *Topic* with more specificity becomes impossible, yet without adding specificity to the *Topic*, many utterances cannot claim a relationship to the *Topic*.

The method of *Turn*, with its association of content, pragmatic information and placement in space and time is a method which by its existence implies negotiation between the *Speakers*. Who is speaking when, for how long, who interrupts, and who is prompted to speak? Why are people prompted to speak, and why do they sometimes opt to *not* obey a prompt?

Conversation is formed via a collaborative process, which requires that participants have a mutual understanding of the coherence of their shared spoken discourse. Grice's *Cooperative Principle* and Sperber & Wilson's *Relevance* (which developed from Grice) both model how conversation participants establish and maintain this understanding. In the *Cooperative Principle*, Grice uses his four *Maxims of Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner* to show that in order for a speaker to "signal her own cooperativeness, and in order to create favorable conditions to maintain her hearer's cooperation, a speaker must indicate "...how she perceives the parts to 'fit together well'" (Lenk 1998b, 21). When conversational participants mutually subscribe to the *Cooperative Principle*, they can speak alternately, that is to say, take turns.

Sperber & Wilson reduced Grice's maxims to their single "*Be relevant*," holding that of Grice's four conversational maxims, only the violation of *Relation* (or, *Relevance*) results in the immediate breakdown of communication<sup>15</sup> (Lenk 1998b, 21). In *Relevance Theory*, Sperber & Wilson maintain that in a conversation, a hearer builds an understanding of the discourse by "constantly [working] out how the new contribution is relevant within the context" (Lenk 1998b, 23). That understanding is in the context of conversational content, background information of the participants, etc. In addition, *Relevance Theory* holds that the hearer also regards how the speaker structures and orders her utterances as "the speaker's evaluation of the utterance's relevance within the context," which in turn informs the hearer's "implicature about the speaker's intended meaning(s)" (Lenk 1998b, 23). Because the listener will assume that the speaker's structure indicates the speaker's evaluation of the speaker's own relevance, the speaker has the task of indicating "how she conceives of the structural organization of her turn and its integration into the overall structure of the ongoing topic...and its relevance in the particular

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<sup>15</sup> Note, though, that Grice also recognized this; in his list of possible violations, only violations of *relevance* are not included. (Lenk 1998b, 22)

context” (Lenk 1998b, 23). To indicate how she is structuring the discourse, the speaker uses lexical signals “that will facilitate the hearer’s activities of interpretation and considerably help to reduce the processing effort” (Lenk 1998b, 23). These lexical signals, as argued by Lenk, quite frequently take the form of DMs.

#### **4.0 DMs and Things That Look Like Them**


My earlier introduction to DMs demonstrated that the various theories of DM function and occurrence share one thing in common: all of the theories called a large variety of signal-bearing expressions DMs, thereby reducing DMs to a group of expressions that all carry pragmatic information, but otherwise share little in common.

For perspective, an analogous error in data grouping for analysis would be to analyze “describing words,” and never attempt to find more closely associated subgroups within “describing words” and analyze those subgroups separately. The outcome would be that for their mutually broad ability to “describe,” adjectives and adverbs would be analyzed as “describing words,” but they would not be analyzed separately in terms of their definitive aspects. Without analyzing the subgroups of “describing words,” the definitive aspects of adjectives and adverbs would be superseded by a general analysis in the context of “descriptive words.”

#### **4.1 Fraser’s Pragmatic Markers**

Bruce Fraser (1990) addresses DMs and their relationship to things which are often mistaken as DMs—other pragmatic markers. Fraser makes a case for three different types of pragmatic markers: **Basic Pragmatic Markers (BPM)**, **Commentary Pragmatic Markers (CPM)**, and **Parallel Pragmatic Markers (PPM)**. Fraser posits that DMs are a specific type of CPM, “analogous to transitive verbs being one type of verb” (Fraser 1990, 387). As a CPM,

DMs share all characteristics of CPM with their pragmatic marker type members, as well as the characteristics which create the need for the subgroup DMs.



*Diagram 1: Fraser's Organization of Pragmatic Markers*

Before I continue with my discussion of the pragmatic marker type CPM and its subgroup DM, for reasons of clarity and passive comparison I will begin the discussion by briefly presenting all three of Fraser's pragmatic marker types.

#### 4.1.1 Characteristics of Basic Pragmatic Markers (BPM)

BPMs make the "intended basic message [illocutionary] force"<sup>16</sup> explicit (Fraser 1990, 386).

<sup>16</sup> Fraser never actually uses the term "illocutionary force," nor "illocutionary force indicating device," though he does juxtapose the terms "illocution" and "force" throughout. From his framework, I was able to associate the

For example,

- 3) John did it. vs. *I suggest* John did it.

In Example 3, the act of the sentence “John did it” being uttered does not change with the addition of *I suggest* to the sentence. However, the phrase *I suggest* assigns the explicit understanding of “John did it” as a CLAIM. Without *I suggest*, “John did it” can be interpreted as a claim, suggestion, acknowledgement or a warning. By assigning explicit understandings to utterances, BPMs serve to carry pragmatic information regarding an utterance’s basic message force—that is, they act as an illocutionary force indicating device (Fraser 1990, 386).

#### 4.1.2 Characteristics of Parallel Pragmatic Markers (PPM)

PPMs “encode an entire message, but one separate from and in addition to the basic and/or commentary message(s)” (Fraser 1990, 387). In addition to functionally-defined words, vocatives are characteristically PPMs.

For example,

- 5) Take your shoes off the table. vs. Take your *damn* shoes off the table.  
 6) Right this way. vs. *Sir*, right this way.

In Example 5, the word *damn* “signals that the speaker is annoyed, perhaps at the shoes being on the table” (Fraser 1990, 387). *Damn* does not itself comment on the utterance’s content as a statement (as would a CPM), nor does it make the illocutionary force of the message explicit (as would a BPM). Instead, *damn* encodes the speaker’s feelings regarding something separate

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“force” he spoke of with an online linguistic glossary (Anderson, Day, Loos, Jordan & Wingate), which provided definitions for “illocutionary force” and related terms. For clarity, I substitute “illocutionary force” in this paper. I am unsure as to why Fraser did not properly address BPMs’ and CPMs’ property of indicating illocutionary force and the specifics thereof, but for the purpose of this paper pursuing the point is gratuitous.

from the utterance altogether—it makes a comment *in addition* to the parent sentence. The shoes are irritating to the speaker not because he is uttering the sentence, and his uttering the sentence or the word *damn* has nothing to do with the speaker’s understanding of the hearer’s stance regarding the shoes (Fraser 1990, 387).

In Example 6, the vocative *Sir* signals the speaker’s perceived social role relative to the hearer, and based on intonation, context, etc., this exact relationship could be of many varieties. Most typically, the use of *Sir* would indicate that the speaker perceives the hearer of higher or perhaps equal social rank as himself.<sup>17</sup> In any case, the use of *Sir* has nothing at all to do with the content of its parent sentence: PPMs neither assign explicit understanding to (as would a BPM) nor comment on the content of their parent sentence (as would a CPM).

#### 4.1.3 Characteristics of Commentary Pragmatic Markers (CPM)

CPMs encode a message of both “[illocutionary] force and content—which constitutes a comment on the basic message itself” (Fraser 1990, 386).

For example,

4) We are lost.                      vs.                      *Unfortunately*, we are lost.

Unlike BPMs, *unfortunately* in Example 4 and the rest of CPM type, does not make explicit the force of the utterance. Instead, CPMs contain content regarding the speaker’s evaluation of the utterance’s content—this is to say that the content in the CPM is separate and independent of the content within its parent sentence, and the CPM content carries with it its own pragmatic information regarding the force of its own content. In the example, *unfortunately*

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<sup>17</sup> It is also possible that the speaker regards the hearer as socially inferior, and is using the vocative *Sir* as a means of sarcasm to punctuate the social distinction. There are many different possibilities as to the social relationship conveyed through vocatives and their pragmatic marker group PPM, but for the purposes of this paper such discussion is gratuitous.



carries content regarding the speaker's understanding of the hearer's stance on their being lost, and the force of that content is that the speaker believes this content to be undesirable in some sense to the hearer<sup>18</sup> (Fraser 1990, 386).

#### 4.2 The CPM subgroup "Discourse Marker"

Now that Fraser's distinctions between pragmatic marker types and where exactly DMs fit within his organizational scheme, I will discuss Fraser's characterization of the CPM subgroup, Discourse Markers.

Fraser makes the important distinction that DMs share form and sound with non-DM words, and these words are in a homonymous relationship with DMs—as opposed to a polysemous relationship. By this distinction, Fraser means that though a word may look and sound like a word which is a DM, it shares only form, and not meaning with its DM homonym<sup>19</sup>. When a word functions as a DM, it has “a core pragmatic meaning, a meaning separate from any content meaning of the homophonous form, and a meaning which signals how the speaker intends the message following to relate to the foregoing discourse” (Fraser 1990, 395). If DMs were polysemous with words with which they share form, the suggestion would be that those words carry meaning associations denoted by DMs, even when not functioning as a DM. Fraser's distinction means that when a word functions as a DM, it is a DM because it performs a specialized pragmatic sequencing function which is part of that word's meaning *only* when the

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<sup>18</sup> Note that *unfortunately* is a CPM, but is not of the subgroup Discourse Marker. Actually, *unfortunately* is within the same subgroup as *incidentally*. Here I use *unfortunately* because it easily characterizes the general attributes of the class CPM. One notices that the force of *unfortunately* is dependent upon its lexical definition and semantic implications, an observation which supports the homonymous attribute of words such as *unfortunately* and *incidentally*. Below, I will clarify how DMs do not rely on homonymy in order to give force to their content, as is required by their membership to CPM.

<sup>19</sup> It is important to not confuse homonymy with polysemy. As used in this paper and (most commonly) by sources cited herein, “homonymous” words are words which share form but have different meanings. If a word is polysemous, all shared forms of it constitute a single word with many (somehow) related meanings.

word is a DM, and this specialized function aspect of the meaning is *not* an aspect of the word's meaning if used for a non-DM function. By Fraser's model, words of the same form as a DM counterpart are homonymous, sometimes described as "bi-functional," and are "unrelated phenomena [from DMs] with different functions and different meaning that just happen to share the same form" (Lenk 1998, 47).

Building from this distinction that DMs are quite separate from words that in form and sound resemble them, Fraser's model groups DMs by their highly-specialized function of providing unique and class-identifiable pragmatic information.<sup>20</sup> To further prove that DMs are grouped by this highly-specialized pragmatic function, as well as their homonymous relationship with words of the same form, Fraser makes the hypothetical source-word point. If DMs were polysemes of their shared-form words, since the non-DM polysemes come from such varied grammatical categories, clearly the common function is *not* the grammatical properties of the would-be polysemous source word, but instead some different, specialized pragmatic function specific to those words functioning as DMs. As Fraser explains, "Discourse Markers are not adverbs, for example, masquerading as another category from time to time" (Fraser 1990, 388). If DMs derived from a specific syntactic category, it would be highly suspect that DMs are simply members of an already-identified syntactic category, and the DM functions would therefore be functions associated with that syntactic category. However, since the hypothetical (hypothetical because Fraser advocates for homonymy) polysemous source words derive from such varied grammatical categories, Fraser theorizes that DMs constitute their own grammatical category. Chart 1 below shows examples of the hypothetical distribution of DM polysemous words' sources:

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<sup>20</sup> Later I will discuss the highly specialized function of DMs, applying pieces of Fraser's model to Lenk's ideas regarding global and local coherence building characteristics of DMs.

<i>Discourse Marker</i>	<i>Lexical Inventory Source of Polysemous Word</i>
Now	Adverbial
To repeat	Literally used phrase
While I have you	Idiomatic phrase
Look	Verb
Well	Interjection
But	Coordinate Conjunction
However	Subordinate Conjunction
Anyway	Ambiguous
OK	Ambiguous

*Chart 1: Hypothetical Discourse Marker Source Distribution*

(Fraser 1990, 388)

Because DMs provide such specialized pragmatic information and derive from all syntactic categories, Fraser creates the grammatical category of Discourse Marker (subgroup of CPM), and claims that the members share characteristics I -VI below:

- I. Members of Fraser's grammatical category DM share a specialized sequencing function in the language. DMs may have homophonous words or expressions that function otherwise, that is, *not as a DM*.

For example,

7. A: I want it finished today. *However*, you do it.
8. A: I want it finished today, *however* you do it.

In the Example 7, *however* contains its own content (its comment on the contrast of expectations between speaker and listener), and within that content lies the basic illocutionary force of the *however*'s content's message, thereby making it a DM by Fraser's

characterization. *However* as in Example 7 means “I want it finished today, and I want it done such that you, not another person, have facilitated its finish.” By assuming this meaning, *however* also gives a force to the sentence that would not otherwise be present—it signals the speaker’s recognition of the contrast in expectations of the task’s undertaker. Note that as used in Example 7 *however* possesses both main properties of a CPM.

In Example 8, *however* serves simply to modify the method of how finishing is to be done, in no way commenting on the discourse relations, but instead serving as a type of manner adverbial. As used in Example 8, *however* means “I want it finished today, and I don’t care how its finish is facilitated, so long as it gets finished.” The use of *however* in Example 8, while it does supplement the content of the utterance, it does not change the force of the utterance. Instead, *however* in Example 8 connects the sentence context as would an adverbial. Without *however* (or an equivalent), the meaning of Example 8 cannot be achieved; *however* does not have its own content in Example 8 as it does in Example 7 (Fraser 1990, 388).

In the readings of Examples 7 and 8, there are two main differences, each having to do with pauses in the immediate vicinity of the occurrence of *however*. In both examples, the pause before *however* differs in type and (therefore) length. In Example 7, a period indicates the completion of the just-uttered thought, signaled by a long pause. In Example 8, a comma indicates the just-uttered thought as to-be-augmented, signaled by a shorter pause. Additionally, in Example 7 there is a shorter pause (indicated by a comma) just after *however*, whereas there is no pause at all after *however* in Example 8. The pause before *however* in Example 7 serves to distinguish two separate thoughts—the desire to have it finished today, and the related but separate directive of exactly who will finish it (you).

Contrastingly, the pause before *however* in Example 8 indicates the desire to have it finished today and (related to that desire) the manner in which it is desired that that finishing be fulfilled. The second half of Example 8, "...*however* you do it," can have two different readings, based on how the "you" is interpreted, but both readings still render *however* as an adverbial, not a DM. By one reading, the "you" is a generic you, meaning, "I want it finished today, and any-which-way that anyone could possibly get it finished is the way in which I want it finished, so long as it gets finished today." By the second reading, "you" is specific to the listener, meaning, "I want it finished today, and any-which-way that you, my listener, could possibly get it finished is the way in which I want it finished, so long as it gets finished today." Notice that with either "you," the second half of Example 8 functions to modify the *manner in which it is to be finished today*, and not by whom it is to be finished. The latter is achieved by the usage of *however* as in Example 7, which reads as "I want it finished today, but I also want you be the one to finish it." While this may seem like hair splitting, *however* as in Example 7 indicates illocutionary force independent of the other utterance content, whereas *however* in Example 8 depends on its juxtaposition with the other utterance content in order to act as an adverbial relating to manner in "how I want it finished today."

The pauses before and after *however* in Example 7 above acts to make *however* function independent of either the thought expressed before or after its occurrence, but by its occurrence it augments the meaning of both utterances. The pause before *however* and the lack of pause after it in Example 8 above acts to make *however* dependent upon the content of its parent sentence for modification, and the sentence prior for its context. As in Example

7, *however* is a DM serving its sequencing function, whereas in Example 8, *however* is simply an adverbial modifying surrounding sentence context.

- II. If an expression is a DM, then “that is its exclusive function in the sentence. (...) What follows from this is the fact that a DM has no effect on the content meaning of a sentence,” since the DM independently augments and comments on its parent sentence’s content but does nothing to alter the parent sentence itself (Fraser 1990, 389).

For example,

9. *However*, I do not drink coffee.

10. There are occasions, *however*, when I drink coffee.

11. I drink tea, *however*.

In Examples 9, 10 and 11 above, the inclusion of the DM *however* in no way changes the content meaning of the sentences. In Example 9, *however* functions to comment on the speaker’s not-drinking-coffee, as contrasted to other things she may do or drink. In Example 10, *however* functions to comment on the speaker’s habit of drinking coffee which contrasts by coffee-drinking situation. Finally, in Example 11 *however* functions to comment on the fact that she does drink tea, though that contrasts with things she does not drink or do. In all three examples, *however* functions to comment on its parent sentence’s relation to some other part of a larger discourse, meanwhile the DM does not change the content meaning itself.

- III. DMs can occur utterance-initially, utterance-internally or utterance-finally, although they typically occur utterance-initially (Fraser 1990, 389).

In Examples 9, 10 and 11 above, the DM *however* is successfully used in each of the three positions. Please see above discussion in II for their individual functions.

IV. The use or omission of DMs “does not alter the potential discourse relationship between the message which follows and the foregoing discourse. (...) a DM does not create meaning as do the other commentary pragmatic markers such as (...) *amazingly*, but only orients the hearer” (Fraser 1990, 390).<sup>21</sup>

V. “DMs are clearly distinguishable from other classes of commentary pragmatic markers which typically occur in utterance-initial position” in that “a DM signals the speaker’s view of how the message following relates to the preceding” (Fraser 1990, 390-391).

- |               |                                   |
|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| 12. Speaker A | Mary left.                        |
| Speaker B     | i. John stayed.                   |
|               | ii. <u>And</u> John stayed.       |
|               | iii. <u>Anyways</u> John stayed.  |
|               | iv. <u>But</u> John stayed.       |
|               | v. <u>So</u> John stayed.         |
|               | vi. <u>However</u> , John stayed. |
|               | vii. <u>Well</u> , John stayed.   |
|               | viii. <u>Then</u> , John stayed.  |
|               | ix. <u>Amazingly</u> John stayed. |

---

<sup>21</sup> The discussion of examples 12i through 12xi illustrates DM characteristics IV and V.

- x. Incidentally John stayed.
- xi. Unfortunately John stayed.

In the above Example 12, Variations ii – viii contain DMs that orient the parent sentence relative to other parts of a larger discourse, without creating meaning within the parent sentence. In Variations ix – xi, the use of non-DM CPMs creates meaning within the parent sentence, subtle though it may be. Specifically, the use of *amazingly* in Variation ix creates the meaning that “John stayed, and that was extraordinarily surprising, (perhaps he was expected to leave since Mary had left).” In Variation x, the use of *incidentally* creates the meaning that “John stayed, and that was unexpected and/or unimportant (regardless of Mary’s departure).” In Variation xi, the use of *unfortunately* creates the meaning that “John stayed, and this was contrary to the wishes of those remaining (who might have preferred that Mary stay instead).” Each usage of the non-DM CPMs orients the content of its parent sentence to the prior discourse (Speaker A’s “Mary left”) but does so via creating new meaning within its parent sentence, and it is through this CPM-created meaning that the two pieces of discourse are related to one another via the CPM, and *not* through a specialized discourse relevance function such as in DMs. As used above, *amazingly*, *incidentally* and *unfortunately* do not signal a sequential discourse relationship as is characteristic of DMs, but instead link utterances by means of creating new meaning therein.

Contrastingly, the use of DMs in Variations ii – viii does not create new meaning within the parent sentence. In Variation ii, *and* orients John’s staying with Mary’s simultaneous leaving. In Variation iii, *anyways* orients John’s staying as unimportant as relative to Mary’s leaving. In Variation iv, *but* orients John’s staying as it contrasts factually to Mary’s leaving



and his (possibly) leaving with her. In Variation v, *so* orients John's staying as a consequence to Mary's leaving. In Variation vi, *however* orients John's staying as it contrasts factually to Mary's leaving and his (possibly) leaving with her. In Variation vii, *well* orients John's staying as uninfluenced by Mary's leaving. In Variation viii, *then* orients John's staying as chronologically relevant to Mary's leaving. In each usage of DMs, the DM orients the content of its parent sentence to the prior discourse (Speaker A's "Mary left") without creating new meaning within its parent sentence; DMs, as demonstrated by ii – viii above serve a sequencing function without creating new meaning within its parent sentence.

VI. Interjections are not DMs. "An interjection (...) is an entirely separate 'sentence', an expression (...) which encodes an entire basic message typically involving the speaker's emotional state" (Fraser 1990: 391).

For example,

13. *Ouch!* I need a Band-Aid.

14. *So,* I need a Band-Aid.

In the Example 13 above, the interjection *ouch* conveys the message that something physically harmful has happened which requires the application of a Band-Aid. Arguably, here *ouch* orients "I need a Band-Aid" with some larger discourse that gives information regarding the events leading to the current need of a Band-Aid. However, as an interjection, *ouch* requires no larger discourse in order to discern the reason for why a Band-Aid would be needed; the expression *ouch* tells us that something physically hurts, and therefore *ouch* by itself acts as the related discourse, and "I need a Band-Aid" the effect of that discourse.

Hence, if *ouch* is the discourse in and of itself, it is not a DM orienting an utterance to a larger or separate discourse.

*So* in Example 14, however, does act as a DM because its presence implies that some larger or separate discourse exists which has created the present need for a Band-Aid. Some “X” discourse happened, and “*so* I need a Band-Aid.” No comment as to current physical pain (as with *ouch*) is made within the word *so*. The word simply functions to orient “I need a Band-Aid” to some larger discourse within which the cause is located.

#### 4.3 Lenk’s DMs and Coherence

Uta Lenk (1998b) addresses DMs and their relationship to the discourse. As established in Data Sample 1 and Sections 2.0 and 2.1 above, in a casual conversation topics change with great frequency and rapidity, speakers make interactional moves with much variation, and none of these conversational features are clearly recognizable out of context. Given that spoken conversation is the most commonly used form of human communication, the ability to navigate this complex interaction is not simply a feat; *something* must function to indicate topic changes (and such), else conversation, in the chaotic and casual form in which we practice it, would hardly be possible. In reference to how listeners and speakers organize talk in order to keep track of the conversation while simultaneously speaking, Lenk states, “Only the use of items that specify relations and connections not only between adjacent but also between remote segments of discourse makes it possible for hearers to figure out how it all fits together” (Lenk 1998b, 3).

Lenk (1998b) strives to prove that discourse markers, in addition to providing pragmatic information in their immediate vicinity “help hearers achieve an understanding of a conversation as a coherent whole” (Lenk 1998b, 3). Before Lenk’s study (1998b), Schiffrin and Redeker

(among others) showed DMs' role in their immediate vicinity. Since these studies, DMs have been generally accepted as words that function to help maintain coherence in their immediate vicinity, that is, *locally*. However, Lenk's analysis looks at DMs as having more than their previously-studied function of signaling *local coherence* in a discourse. In her analysis, Lenk posits that additionally, DMs function to structure the entire discourse and link remote, non-sequential parts of the discourse to one another, that is, DMs signal *global coherence*.

#### 4.3.1 Global Coherence

Casual conversations are characterized by a multitude of interactional developments which result from the variety of conversational activities that are at the participants' disposal. These include (frequent) changes of topic, digressions from and later returns to a topic, and perhaps even parallel maintained topics when the conversation temporarily splits up into several conversational strands. These different conversational strands can be maintained separately for a while and may then converge again. The question of coherence arises when a participant in or an analyzer of this conversation are trying to make sense of how it is all connected. (Lenk 1998b, 17)

As Lenk well characterizes, the many different interactional developments of conversation create quite an obstacle to participants and/or analyzers of the conversation, simply because it becomes increasingly difficult to understand "how it is all connected" (Lenk 1998b, 17). *Global coherence* refers to "the relations between segments in the discourse that appear further apart, with other stretches of discourse in between" (Lenk 1998b, 27), meaning, *global coherence relations* are those relations which grant some organization to the chaos of conversation, because they show the connections between related but non-sequential pieces of discourse.

Sperber and Wilson observe, "[interpreting an utterance] involves seeing the contextual effects of this assumption in a context determined, at least in part, by earlier acts of comprehension" (Sperber & Wilson 1986, 118). Schourup, Schiffrin and Redeker all hold that DMs provide implicit information and convey the presence of relationships between the

utterance and some non-uttered “other world” or “plane of talk.” Lenk’s concept of DMs’ global coherence-granting function provides for the maintaining relevance despite the chaos of conversation, and doing so via DMs. The concept is not a huge leap, in that Lenk simply applies a previously-identified and accepted function of DMs to a larger unit of analysis: beyond utterances, and to the level of discourse.

#### 4.3.2 A Small Problem with Lenk

My one qualm with Lenk is her treatment of the Homonymy and Polysemy debate with regards to DMs. Lenk refutes Fraser’s assertion that DMs are purely bi-functional and not bi-semantic. Lenk argues that cases can be made which prove that a DM (by her definition of DM) utilizes a same-form counterpart’s lexical value in order to convey its pragmatic function—that is, rather than being homonymous with DMs, by Lenk’s analysis words of same form as DMs, are polysemous with DMs. Lenk provides the following Examples<sup>22</sup> 15 and 16:

15)<sup>23</sup>

- a        business letters between people are tutoiant<sup>24</sup> so to say
- A        ^no I ^no I ^no I suppose that is . perhaps ^yes# - I ^I’ve got an e:normous number of them# - [@m] ^which I would be perfectly willing to ((syll)) let you have# - . but I ^thought perhaps it ((would)) better \*be ((3 sylls))\*
- a        \*well this this\* is fine to be going on with yes **incidentally** would you excuse me for about two minutes .
- A        \*\*^yes#\*\*
- a        \*\*I’ve\*\* just got to go and see a man upstairs and [@] I’ll be back [@] genuinely within three minutes

(Lenk 1998b, 48)

<sup>22</sup> Data in these examples come from examples within Lenk’s 1998 text, but originate from the London–Lund-Corpus. A quick guide to prosodic transcription symbols used in this corpus can be found in Appendix II.

<sup>23</sup> This interaction is on the telephone and speaker (a) needs to be excused from the conversation to speak to a man who is actually physically present.

<sup>24</sup> Lenk gives no explanation for the word “tutoiant,” and I cannot offer one myself. Whatever its meaning, the word has no bearing on actual example, and I include it here strictly because this is how Lenk provided the example in her work.

- 16)<sup>25</sup>  
 tl and it was only when he stabbed ((a)) sergeant# that they let him go # and (laughter)  
 f I suppose **incidentally** became very popular with the other ranks#
- (Lenk 1998b, 48)

In Lenk's analysis, the use of *incidentally* in Example 15 is as a DM, whereas in Example 16 *incidentally* instead refers to the manner in which the previously mentioned "he" became "popular with the other ranks," and *not* as a DM. Regardless of this functional difference in the use of *incidentally* between Example 15 and Example 16, Lenk holds that both instances of *incidentally* "share the meaning of a 'subordinate' or chance occurrence" (Lenk 1998b, 47-48), and since they share this meaning, that Fraser's analysis, which stated that DMs have "a core pragmatic meaning... separate from any content meaning of the homophonous form" (Fraser 1990, 395), is flawed.

However, Lenk's argument for DM polysemy against Fraser's homonymy is blatantly flawed in its comparison because of a paradox inherent to her argument. Although by Lenk's model *incidentally* is a DM, by Fraser's model, *incidentally* as used by Lenk in both of her examples is not a DM at all, because Lenk's example uses what Fraser considers a non-DM homonymous form of the word *incidentally*. Although Fraser's organization of pragmatic markers places Lenk's *incidentally* in the same subgroup CPM as DMs, his characterization of the subgroup for DMs categorically disallows *incidentally* from being a DM. Rather than prove polysemy over homonymy for homophonous forms of DMs, Lenk's example only illustrates inconsistency in the application of Fraser's model with regards to homonymy.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>25</sup> This interaction is between a talk radio host (f) and his guest (tl). The host adds to the thought of the guest, so that the utterance makes most sense when read as though from a single speaker.

<sup>26</sup> Please see Diagram 1, Section 4.1.2 and Section 4.2 for relevant parts of Fraser's framework.

#### 4.4 Lenk and Fraser, Together

Lenk's idea of global coherence is not affected by recognizing DM homonymy rather than her proposed polysemy. In fact, the polysemy/homonymy debate is the only incompatibility between Fraser's model for DM placement in the pragmatic marker family and Lenk's concept of DMs' simultaneous global and local coherence conveyance. As Lenk's global and local coherence model is not affected by adopting the position of homonymy, and Fraser's organizational model is therein preserved, with the disproof of Lenk's proof against Fraser's homonymy position, the two can be used in tandem, as I do herein.

#### 5.0 Spoken Discourse and Revealing its Structure

One may ask, "What is the utility of studying discourse markers, and why is it important to know such specific information about them?" While written discourse typically features easily-identifiable structure, spoken discourse requires its participants to have some passive understanding of its implicit structure. The fact that conversation participants in Data Sample 1 above continue conversing with little or no hesitation illustrates that participants in the conversation have some understanding of the structure in place, and can carry on a fluid conversation despite frequent topic changes. As established by linguists such as Schourup, Schiffrin, Redeker, and others, DMs have a pragmatic function in spoken discourse, and grant sequential information to those utterances occurring within their immediate vicinity. Fraser posits that DMs are a specific type of pragmatic marker, and their function is highly specialized and identifiable. Lenk takes earlier ideas of DMs a step further, saying that not only do they grant *local coherence* to utterances, but perhaps even more importantly, DMs grant *global*

*coherence* to discourses. When considered cumulatively, these studies overwhelmingly point to DMs as vital to the creation and maintenance of the structure of spoken discourse; therefore understanding DMs is likewise vital to developing our understanding of how the brain creates and maintains structure in language and thought.

Since gaining a better understanding of DMs allows us to develop our understanding of the structure of language, correspondingly, studying DMs enables us better understand spoken language as a whole. As stressed by Halliday:

It is in spontaneous, operational speech that the grammatical system of a language is most fully exploited, such that its semantic frontiers expand and its potential for meaning is enhanced. This is why we have to look to spoken discourse for at least some of the evidence on which to base our theory of the language. (qtd. in Eggins & Slade, 1997, 316)

The rapidity and spontaneity required of participants in casual conversation demand that participants use language efficiently, effectively and quickly. The very fact that conversation participants are able to maintain coherence, despite lack of explicitly-addressed topic changes, shows that in casual conversation, participants utilize an efficient, effective and quick means of structure with neither planning nor editing. To understand how language is used with such efficiency, effectiveness and rapidity, we must study the instances which most commonly require the use of language in these ways, one of which is casual conversation.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, within these instances, we must explore what aspects of language allow it to be used in such a manner. I believe DMs are an aspect of language which contribute greatly to its efficient, effective and rapid usability.

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<sup>27</sup> As mentioned in Section 2.0, some forms of written language, particularly technology-aided written communication, resemble casual conversation. I believe the study of these forms, too, would yield valuable information with regards to language used in the context of rapidity and spontaneity, but exploration of these forms is beyond the scope of this paper.

In Section 2 above, I showed that one of the main difficulties of spoken discourse is that unlike written discourse, spoken discourse is not by its very nature preserved, thus mandating that all spoken discourse organization be done on-the-spot. Similarly, the analysis of written discourse is much easier in that by its very existence, written discourse is available in an analyzable medium. The analysis of spoken discourse, however, requires the actual event of the discourse to be somehow preserved, thereby putting the spoken discourse into an analyzable medium. Usually, this is in the form of a recording spoken discourse, and later transcribing the recording.

### 5.1 DMs and Organization in Transcription

In transcribing spoken discourse for purpose of linguistic analysis, transcription practices are aimed at preserving spoken discourse *as it was uttered*. Considering the limitations of symbols on a page in terms of their ability to convey the actual human language produced, transcription does a decent job of lending representation to phonetic sounds, pauses, intonation, etc.<sup>28</sup> If familiar with the transcribing conventions of a particular transcription, a reader of a transcribed spoken discourse can somewhat easily reproduce what the conversation sounded like.<sup>29</sup> Though transcripts are usually sound-for-sound representative of what was said during the event of the spoken discourse, anyone who has read a transcription of spoken discourse recognizes that it is much more difficult to follow a transcribed version of spoken discourse than to follow a spoken discourse in its original spoken form. Simply stated, while understanding the content of a conversation is quite easy while participating in the conversation, understanding the

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<sup>28</sup> I have not addressed the effects of these in the structure of spoken discourse, because that area of inquiry is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to say that features such as phonetic sounds, pauses and intonation do grant structure to spoken discourse.

<sup>29</sup> The transcript of Data Sample 1 is simplified; many annotations, such as those for intonation, have been removed from the original transcript in the interest of providing a more readable transcript.



content of a conversation by only reading its transcription is very difficult. Clearly, the difficulty in understanding lies in the change of medium, from the rich world of human interaction to the representational world of transcription on paper.

In Section 3 above I discuss the different methods which I use to organize conversation. By organizing conversation by these methods, it becomes possible to analyze conversation in the context the specific properties *Event*, *Speaker*, *Topic* and *Turn*. In Section 4 above I discuss Discourse Markers, and given their function as suggested by the works of Schourup, Schiffrin, Redeker, Fraser and Lenk it is clear that DMs convey coherence relationships between adjacent utterances and non-adjacent utterances/discourse segments. These coherence relationships are based on the homonymous meaning of the DMs, as well as how the DMs' function within the context of the utterance or discourse content. Therefore, to study DMs, it would be useful to analyze conversation within the context of specific properties of that conversation, thereby helping to identify how the DM works with those properties to structure and organize the conversation.

### **5.1.2 My Difficulty with Transcripts**

When I began this paper, I realized that many of my frustrations with analyzing real conversational data were in the area of information processing. I found myself reading the transcripts out loud, following every possible transcription symbol in order to re-construct the interaction between conversation participants. Only through reading aloud and ridiculous amounts of re-enactment was I able to understand how the conversation flowed, and what exactly made the change from one topic to another, and then back to a topic from five minutes' prior—what exactly held all those changes together when everything seemed random and chaotic.

My re-enactments, I found, were simply methods of differentiating and organizing the data. For example, without even trying, I used one voice for Speaker I, and another voice for Speaker II, to help establish which utterance was coming from which *Speaker*. After going through the entire conversation, I realized that the participants were working from banks of knowledge of the world, themselves and one another. Upon speaking about this knowledge, the participants were establishing broad *Topics*, which they would drop and pick up again, broaden and make more specific—in short, the conversation participants were constantly building relationships between completely different topics as they spoke. But to understand the relationships the participants were building between *Topics*, I had to understand as much as I could about the participants themselves—the *Speakers*. Also, I had to understand as much as I could about what fell within each *Topic* for the *Speakers*, so that when they related one utterance to another seemingly unrelated utterance, the relationship between the *Topics* of each utterance became clear.

Lastly, my re-enactments made me aware that utterances in conversation have two important components: 1) their time of occurrence and 2) the utterer responsible for them (or, *Speaker*). With my single vocal tract, it was impossible to re-enact more than a single utterance at a time. Although sometimes it would have been useful to re-enact more than one utterance at a time (for example, when conversation participants speak at the same time), the necessity to alternate between the voices I adopted for each conversational participant made it clear that, generally speaking, conversation participants take turns at making utterances. A single participant cannot have more than a single utterance at a time, for the simple reason that a single *Speaker* has but a single vocal tract. Likewise, if Speaker I makes an utterance upon which Speaker II's response is contingent, it is most likely that those two utterances occur sequentially,

not simultaneously (though there is often overlap between beginnings and endings of utterances). Although this last observation may seem basic and near the point of absurd simplicity, it is a simple aspect casual conversation that completely escaped me while *reading* the transcriptions of real conversational data; while reading I had utmost difficulty understanding how the utterances of a single or both participants related to one another. It was only by the necessity of re-enacting these organizational aspects of conversation that I realized their existence.

I concluded that when we actually participate in conversation, there are organizational factors of that conversation not shown in a simple transcription of the utterances therein—hence my adoption of re-inserting them via antics when I read the transcripts. While typical transcripts do denote different participants, it is usually not readily apparent in the transcribed text; yet, in actual conversation, it is blatantly obvious from whom an utterance comes—utterances from different *Speakers* come from different people, with real, visible, physically-present bodies. Likewise, in conversation we build mental models of the *Topics* in discussion, we have recollections of previous *Events* of conversation, and by limitation of our one-apiece vocal tracts and need to hear one another, we take *Turns* speaking (and sometimes, we don't).

For a transcript to better communicate conversational data, it needs to address these elements of organization which are present in the original form of spoken discourse, in addition to the transcribed spoken discourse.

## **5.2 Adding Structure to Transcripts**

Since most transcriptions are formatted in a simple vertical line-by-line manner with time stamping and speaker labels, as in Data Sample 1, it is difficult to decipher when utterances happen with respect to one another. The typical transcript formatting suggests purely sequential

relationships between utterances. Since spoken discourse allows for utterances both adjacent and non-adjacent to build coherence with one another, and the coherence is based on more than sequence, the typical formatting of transcripts is misleading, and makes understanding the coherence of transcribed spoken discourse quite difficult. I propose adding the organizational methods of *Event*, *Speaker*, *Topic* and *Turn* to the transcription by method of display. By using visual layout of the transcript to show the organizational methods of *Event*, *Speaker*, *Topic* and *Turn*, the transcript in effect allows for the more clear conveyance of sequencing information. This *Structured Transcript* has an increased ability to supply clearer representation of the organization of spoken discourse. The task of researchers of spoken discourse becomes much easier because the *Structured Transcript* (or, ST) effectively uses visual representation as a substitute for the organizational information lost in changing from spoken to transcribed medium.

### 5.2.1 Event in an ST

The organizational method of *Event* is mainly useful when working with more than one transcribed spoken discourse, since the method embodies the entirety of the occurrence of a particular spoken discourse. If a researcher is working with, for example, four different occurrences of spoken discourses between Speaker I and Speaker II, it is important to keep the *Events* separate organizationally. In terms of sbc0005 (in its original transcribed form, Appendix III) I call it *Event* $\alpha$ , and were I to study an additional *Event* in which Speaker I and/or Speaker II of *Event*  $\alpha$  participate, I would term the occurrence *Event*  $\beta$ . This naming system is somewhat arbitrary, and the Greek letters can be substituted with another naming convention. To incorporate the *Event* organizational method into the ST, I suggest the use of a post-modifier for

*Event* so that when considering more than a single *Event*, the researcher can easily specify to which *Event* she is referring.

In the ST, I identify *Event* $\alpha$  as such by labeling *Event* $\alpha$  clearly on page 1, including date, time, duration and location of the *Event*, as provided by the original data collectors. To help the researcher remain continually aware of which event with which is working, I have noted *Event*  $\alpha$  as a border to every page of the ST. Though the simple notation of *Event*  $\alpha$  on every page may seem insignificant, when considering multiple transcripts of conversations in which one did not oneself participate, the continual visual cue provides much assistance in organizing the data. When participants in conversations speak to one another, they have recollections of previous conversations. Because they actually experienced its occurrence on the original date, at the original time, for its entire duration and at its original location, conversation participants have an implicit differentiating ability between *Events*. To represent this in an ST is a simple task of assigning a transcript an *Event* classification, and giving continual visual cues within the ST to remind the researcher of the *Event* to which the utterances under scrutiny belong.

### 5.2.2 Speaker in an ST

The organizational method of *Speaker* is useful for any analysis of spoken discourse, as it classifies utterances by the conversation participant who made them. Additionally, *Speaker* associates the background information of the participant with his/her utterance.

To note the background information of the *Speakers*<sup>30</sup> I have simply put the information on Page 1 of the ST. The *Speaker*'s names, sex, age, place of birth, completed level of education, field of work and ethnicity, as provided in the data source, are listed beneath their respective *Speaker I, Channel 1* and *Speaker II, Channel 2* headings.<sup>31</sup> Beneath this, I have listed

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<sup>30</sup> Please see Section 3.1.2 for discussion of background information of a *Speaker*.

<sup>31</sup> See below for explanation of the term "Channel."

background information about the *Speakers* as gleaned from *Event α*; this information is marked with an asterisk (\*).

Typical transcripts of spoken discourse are displayed like that in Appendix III, a simple vertical line-by-line transcription with timestamps. Such display is problematic for two reasons. Primarily, it is difficult for a researcher to identify from whom utterances come. For example, in Appendix III, in order to know which utterances belong to which conversant, the researcher must constantly reference the speaker label. Secondly, the transcript displays utterances in strict chronological order. While this presentation does present the utterances in their natural order, it creates two unnecessary difficulties: the difficulty of understanding instances of simultaneous speech, and the difficulty of seeing coherence across multiple, non-adjacent utterances of the same *Speaker*.

The transcription in Appendix III uses the typical convention of placing all transcribed material from a spoken discourse in a single column of the document, and noting the participant responsible for the utterance in an adjacent column. In Appendix III, the third column contains all transcribed data, and the second column contains conversation participant names. A participant is responsible for all data to the right, continuing downward from the line shared with the data, until another participant name is listed below. The leftmost column contains a line-by-line timestamp, indicating the start and ending point (in seconds) of the utterance. For example, Darryl is attributed all transcribed data from timestamp 0.00 through 10.27, beginning with the text line, "But," as indicated by his name in the middle column at line 0.00, and ending with text line "(TSK) (H)," as indicated by the name of a different participant on the line after that ending at 10.27. Additionally, utterances are typically assigned timestamps in smaller chunks, for example utterance "... but to try and .. and talk me out of believing in

Murphy's Law," begins 3.46 seconds into the conversation and ends 6.71 seconds into the conversation, which is all within the 0.00 through 10.27 attributed to the participant Darryl. Needless to say, the researcher cannot easily attribute an utterance to a participant by simply reading the transcribed speech as displayed.

In the ST, I have given each *Speaker* his/her own Channel—Channel 1 for *Speaker I* and Channel 2 for *Speaker II*. I have chosen the term *Channel* because it is a commonly used term when recording speech. In data collection, when multiple speakers are being recorded, often they each have individual microphones, and audio technicians term the individual microphones in terms of which audio *channel* they occupy. Excluding ambient and background noise, the only data on an audio channel is the speech of the specific speaker using the microphone associated with that channel. The recorded conversation (or, *Event*) consists of all the audio *channels* combined, while the individual contributions of *Speakers* are their solely respective *channels*. Also, since the *channels* are parts of a whole conversation, which is by nature mutually-constructed, *channels* are not an adequate conversational data source outside the context of their co-constructed *channels*.

In the ST in Appendix IV, only utterances made by *Speaker I* are in Channel 1 (on the left), and only utterances made by *Speaker II* are in Channel 2 (on the right); this visual division of *Speakers* in the ST is its most noticeable difference from a typical transcript. Just as with *Event*, to help the researcher keep an awareness of which *Speaker* is in which channel, I have noted *Speaker I* and *Speaker II* on the corresponding side of each page of the ST. Since the utterances are organized by *Speaker*, and this organization is represented in the ST visually through separate channels/columns, the researcher can easily attribute utterances to *Speaker* while reading the transcript, simply by noting which column in which the utterance is. This

method of utterance organization is analogous to that which humans do in actual conversation: the separate columns act to give separate physical location to the transcriptions of utterances, much like our separate bodies act to give separate physical location to the vocal origin of our utterances. Likewise, just as the background information participants gather about a specific participant via conversation is called to mind when they hear an utterance origination from the body of that particular participant, the corresponding background information of the *Speaker* (as listed on page 1 under each channel) is called to mind when researchers read transcribed utterances in particular channels.

### 5.2.3 Topic in an ST

The organizational method of *Topic* would be immensely useful in the analysis of spoken discourse. A visual representation of the subjects discussed in casual conversation would give researchers an invaluable tool of modeling and comparison. Though it is clear that a *Topic* level of conversational organization exists, the facts that *Topic* has neither physical form nor definable occurrence in time make its visual representation in a transcript of spoken language quite challenging. After much effort and countless attempts, I have concluded that at this point, it is beyond the scope of an ST to communicate the organization that *Topic* grants to casual conversation, because it is beyond my abilities (and possibly those of the linguistic research community) to quantify topic. In order for an organizational method to be given graphic representation, there must be some definitive aspect of it which can be represented. *Event* can be graphically represented because it has the definitive aspects of having occurred in time and space. *Speaker* can be graphically represented because it characterizes a real human being responsible



for utterances (which definitively occurred in time and space), as well as that human being's background information (which is also generally definite).

A *Topic*, by its very occurrence in conversation evolves to incorporate new relationships to other *Topics*, meaning the *Topic* is always variable. If it were possible to isolate a fixed number of *Events* participated in by *Speakers* of completely known and revealed background information, it may be plausible for a researcher to exhaustively model the *Topics* within those events, as with this information the researcher could presumably understand references made via words and related concepts in the conversation. Yet still, even with all such fixed information, the researcher cannot know how the *Speakers* themselves process the utterances—that is to say, the researcher cannot know what exactly the *Speakers* think about the utterances. Without this information, the researcher cannot really know under what *Topic(s)* utterances fall. Since the researcher cannot know under which *Topic(s)* utterances fall, the researcher cannot accurately model how conversation participants organize their conversation by *Topic*.

In my early attempts to incorporate *Topic* into the ST, I applied a letter coding system to utterances of what appeared to be the same *Topic*. (I offer this early work in Appendix V, though I make no claim to consistency or accuracy). The coding system related utterances to one another as per relationships I saw between them, given shared content, ideas, and question/answer sequences. As is the nature of projects such as a thesis, when I was working on constructing a graphical representation of *Topic* in transcripts, I would take breaks from the work. Without fail, when I returned to the work after a break, despite whether it had been for a few minutes or a few days, my understanding of the which utterances belonged to which *Topics*, as well as what the *Topic* could actually be defined as, had changed. During the breaks, my experience of language and human life had created for me new relationships between utterances

and the *Topics* they employed. Immediately, I realized that as a language-using human experiencing everyday life, I have an inherent lack of objectivity in the matter of *Topic* vis-à-vis perception—my understanding of how utterances relate to one another via *Topic* will be invariably different from that of their actual utterer. Indeed, almost any researcher has this obstacle. Arguably, if the researcher were the same person as the utterer, the researcher would be able to understand all relationships between the *Topics* he made during the actual conversation.<sup>32</sup>

In addition to the revelation of lacking an objective idea of what *Topics* occurred during a conversation, this experience illustrated the problem of graphically representing something as amorphous as *Topic*—how do you represent something which is amorphous? The graphic representation itself implies a fixed form to *Topic* which is not true to the nature of the organizational method. Each time I returned to the task of incorporating a representation of *Topic* into the ST, I returned to the same problem: though the graphic representation was able to show relationships between and existence of *Topics*, by representing those relationships and existences, I was giving them a definitive form. The problem with this definitive form was that with my ever-changing understanding of the *Topics*, I defined their forms differently—each return to my work showed different utterances employing different *Topics* and relating to other utterances differently (although, I did understand some utterances to consistently employ the same *Topic* and consistently relate to other specific utterances). The method of representing them was not itself flawed, so much as the fact that graphically representing them carried the implication that amorphous *Topics* are of a singular definitive form.

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<sup>32</sup> In a Freudian analysis it is arguable that even the *Speaker* himself is unaware of how, why, or even that he makes relationships between utterances.

It seems that in order to incorporate the method of *Topic* into the ST, the researcher must be prepared to make some assertions regarding the exact structure of the transcribed spoken discourse, as 2-dimensional graphical representation by nature limit the relationships and existences of *Topics*. In my attempts to incorporate *Topic* into the ST, I tested countless diagrams, charts and coding systems, yet all with the same frustrating end—they implied boundaries and limitations to *Topics* which were crossed and broken almost as soon as they were formed. To represent *Topic* of casual conversation, in addition to a preserved form of the conversation, researchers need an active and malleable medium.

I imagine that *Topic* could be well represented using the basic organizational framework of the Internet. Hypertext in web pages works much like *Topic* does in conversation. The term *hypertext* is defined as “a computer-based text retrieval system that enables a user to access particular locations in webpage or other electronic documents by clicking on links within specific webpage or documents” (The American Heritage Dictionary 4<sup>th</sup> ed. 2000). For example in a the webpage about US history in Appendix VI, if one clicks on the hypertext “United States,” another webpage opens with facts about the United States. The first webpage is still accessible to the user, but if the user chooses, she may pursue more information about the United States, and follow different hypertext links until she is no longer reading about the US, but instead about any number of topics which are linked to US history through any number of degrees of separation.

Placing hypertext in webpage offers the same potential for topic deviation as do the cognitive relationships we create between conversational *Topics*. Just as with conversational *Topics*, in following a slight deviation from the original topic of Internet research and following any combination of the many available hypertext links, that slight deviation, through degrees of

separation, relates what would have seemed two entirely different *Topics*. The potential for relationships between topics of research on the Internet, as facilitated by hypertext, is virtually limitless. Although a researcher must actually create the hypertext links between utterances, the display of hypertext does not implicate a definite form of how those utterances are related—that is to say, the linkages themselves represent *Topic*, and since these linkages can be continually updated and edited, the linkages do not define *Topic* as would a visual representation (such as color coding, etc.) A model of casual conversation utilizing ST as in Appendix IV and hypertext between the utterances could well represent how conversation is actually structured by such an amorphous method as *Topic*.<sup>33</sup>

#### 5.2.4 Turn in an ST

The organizational method of *Turn* is useful for the analysis of spoken discourse as it organizes the spoken discourse content by both chronology and *Speaker* responsibility. When trying to understand why a *Speaker* makes a particular statement, what prior *Topic* to which the *Speaker* is relating an utterance, or the context of a particular utterance, exactly *when* during the conversation that utterance was made and by whom are of utmost importance.

As addressed above with regards to *Speaker* in 5.2.2, the single column display of typical transcripts is creates difficulties and misconceptions with regards to which participants are responsible for which utterances. Similarly, the display of typical transcripts creates difficulties and misconceptions with regards to when utterances occur relative to one another. In the ST, for the organizational method of *Speaker*, I have displayed the utterances in two separate

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<sup>33</sup> The reader may be interested in related project I found on the Internet, called the Visual Thesaurus. This tool allows a user to look up a word, and then creates an interactive map with related words and meanings. Each aspect of the map is hypertext, and the map itself acts to show relationships by degrees of separation. It can be accessed at <http://www.visualthesaurus.com/>.

columns/channels. In addition to representing *Speaker* responsibility, the channels also give visual representation to the *Turn* organizational method.

Since casual conversation is based around spontaneity, it is important to know a *Turn*'s time of occurrence relative to other utterances, because the content within one *Turn* usually influences the content within another. In typical transcripts, timestamp is displayed in a single column which corresponds to an adjacent column containing the transcription of the conversation. To know which *Speaker* is responsible for utterances during a specific period of time, the researcher must find the timestamp, match the timestamp to its utterance and then match the utterance to its responsible *Speaker*. While not an incredibly difficult task, this is time consuming, and particularly confusing in instances of simultaneous utterances. For example:

113.37	114.12	DARRYL:	it's it's [ma ] . . .
113.89	114.74	PAMELA:	[The] food is like,
114.74	115.46		all [2unique2],
115.03	115.40	DARRYL:	[2Hey2].
115.46	116.11	PAMELA:	and [3wonderful,
115.73	117.68	DARRYL:	[3I- it's major-league3] Yin and Yang.
116.11	116.83	PAMELA:	and heavenly3]

(CSAE: A Book About Death)

In the above excerpt from original sbc0005 transcript above, the content within square brackets is content which is uttered simultaneously with other content. By looking at the labels in the middle column, it is obvious that Darryl and Pamela are speaking simultaneously, and closer inspection of the timestamps in the leftmost column shows that Darryl speaks from timestamp 113.37 to 114.12 whereas Pamela speak from timestamp 113.89 to 114.74—meaning, the simultaneous speech occurs between 113.89 seconds into the conversation (when Pamela begins speaking during a time in which Darryl was already speaking), and 114.12 seconds into the conversation (when Darryl stops speaking, though

Pamela continues speaking). Unless researchers pay close attention to the timestamp, it would be easy to overlook the brackets indicating simultaneous speech.<sup>34</sup> Likewise, since instances of simultaneous speech can happen so quickly (the first instance in the above example is little more than half of a second), and often involve no more than a few words or even syllables, researchers may easily overlook their occurrence.

In the ST, all utterances of *Event a* are displayed in their respective *Speaker* channel in chronological order, as are the timestamps attributing the utterances' time of occurrence in the *Event*. Since every utterance is assigned a timestamp, there is no reason to show the timestamp of an utterance in any channel other than that channel belonging to the responsible *Speaker*. For example, in Appendix IV from timestamp 27.22 through 97.27, Darryl is responsible for no utterances, meaning it is not his *Turn*. Since it is not Darryl makes no utterances during that period, there is no utility in including a timestamp in his channel during that time. Correspondingly, it is quite important that Pamela's utterances from timestamp 27.22 to 97.27 are displayed adjacent to the timestamp indicating their time of occurrence.

The CSAE data is transcribed such that timestamp segments (for example, 0.00 to 3.46) are assigned to small chunks of speech, but with no discernible system of size of these chunks. These chunks may comprise an entire *Turn* or merely a section of a *Turn*, depending on how long the participant continuously speaks, the types of pauses the *Speaker* utilizes and the non-speaking *Speaker's* contributions (or attempted contributions) during the course of the other *Speaker's* talking. Because of this method of timestamping, it is not possible to even attempt assigning boundaries to *Turns* in this ST. However, since it is possible to look at the timestamps as displayed in the ST and discern the *beginnings* of a *Speaker's Turns*, I have indicated these

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<sup>34</sup> Some transcriptions do not use such obvious symbols for simultaneous speech; others do not notate the occurrence of simultaneous speech whatsoever.

beginnings with horizontal black lines. Darryl (*Speaker I*) begins *Turns* at timestamps 0.00, 12.97, 13.87, 16.95, etc. Pamela (*Speaker II*) begins *Turns* at timestamps 10.27, 13.53, 14.56, 17.58, etc. Note that these beginnings never occur before the end of the *Speaker's* prior *Turn*—indicating the obvious fact that, given a single vocal tract, a person can make only one utterance at a time. Also, the timestamps at the beginnings of *Turns* are never contiguous with the last timestamp of the *Speaker's* immediately previous *Turn*, indicating that the time between the two stamps was occupied by utterances made by another *Speaker*.

### 5.3 Analyzing Structure and Structure-Related Elements of Casual Conversation in an ST

With the organizational methods of *Event*, *Speaker* and *Turn* incorporated into the ST, the analysis of structure-related elements of casual conversation becomes much more feasible for researchers. With typical transcripts it is necessary to basically re-enact the conversation in order to understand how the utterances “fit” together—that is, how the utterances are structured within the spoken discourse. The re-enactment of transcribed casual conversation is actually a re-insertion of organizational aspects of casual conversation that are lost when it is analyzed in its transcribed, written medium. By giving visual representation to organizational aspects of casual conversation, the ST effectively decreases the researcher’s need to re-enact the conversation, as well as provides a much more usable form of the data. Without much less of the structural confusion and misrepresentation inherent to typical transcripts, the ST also provides an interface for analysis which is much more accommodating to the analysis of structure and structure-related elements of casual conversation.

In the ST in Appendix IV, I have highlighted utterances generally accepted as DMs by the frameworks discussed in Sections 2.2 and 4.0 of this paper. Though I do not make attempt to

formally analyze these suspect DMs herein, upon a casual evaluation of the ST with suspect DMs highlighted, it would appear that indeed, DMs do function to build local coherence. This casual evaluation is based on the DMs' location relative to the beginnings of *Turns*, as made visually apparent by the ST's display and the suspect DMs highlighter-revealed occurrences. Additionally, upon reading the ST, it does seem that the suspect DMs build local coherence by relating *Topics* across both sequential and non-sequential *Turns*. Further, based on the content of the *Event*, it seems that the *Speakers* reference *Topics* in previous *Events*, and the presence of DMs at the point of these references also supports Lenk's theory of global coherence. However, these observations are to remain casual here, as this researcher lacks the linguistic research aptitude and conversational analysis knowledge to tackle such an analysis of DMs.

## **6.0 Conclusion: Analyzing DMs, etc. in an ST**

Section 2 of this paper strives to demonstrate the rapid and spontaneous nature of spoken discourse, and how this nature creates a different structure in casual spoken discourse than formal spoken discourse and most written discourses. Section 3 of this paper demonstrates that by nature of its medium, conversation has many organizational features. I propose using the methods of *Event*, *Speaker*, *Topic* and *Turn* to organize conversation, allowing the analysis of the conversation within the context of these specific aspects. Section 4 of this paper provides a more complete illustration of DMs than was provided earlier by orienting DMs as a subgroup within Fraser's pragmatic marker family and fitting this placement with Lenk's concept global and local coherence, as conveyed by DMs. In Section 5, given that DMs perform a specialized structuring function in spoken discourse and typical transcripts contain little or no representation of the organizational features of casual conversation, I demonstrate the researchers' need of the



inclusion of conversation organizational features in transcripts. To address this need, I construct a *Structured Transcript* by incorporating visual representations of *Event*, *Speaker* and *Turn* into a typical transcript of casual conversation, as well as provide ideas for the representation of *Topic* via an Internet-like model with hypertext.

## 7.0 Future Research

This study leaves interesting possibilities for future work. In this paper I use DMs as a means of illustrating that in order to analyze structure-related elements of spoken discourse, researchers need to look at the structure and organization of conversation *in addition to* its content. However, using the ST, one could now feasibly analyze and demonstrate the local and global structuring functions of DMs as per the model I adopt herein, since a structural analysis of casual conversation is much simpler when additional visual representation is given to organization present during the actual conversation. In order to conduct such an analysis, researchers should develop the ST further so as to visually represent *Topic*, thereby creating visual associations between the occurrences of DMs relative to changes, shifts, continuances, returns and dropping of *Topics*. For this addition of *Topic*, I suggest using a framework similar to that of hypertext and the Internet, though more savvy researchers may devise different solutions.

With demonstrations of the usage of DMs as structuring functions in spoken casual conversation, it would be quite interesting to test for statistical differences between DM occurrence in casual conversations in person, between people of different language backgrounds, between people of different sensory disabilities, and in different communication environments. Research regarding conversational analysis stresses the importance of not only verbal

communication in conversation, but also of non-verbal communication, such as eye contact, gestures, posture, facial expression, etc. Deborah Schiffrin (1987) suggests a correlation between DMs and gestures, wherein DMs are a sort of linguistic-substitute for gestures one would use to give emphasis to certain points of one's discourse. Though she makes no firm claim, from my own experience, observations, and research, this seems to be true. It seems that DMs could quite easily be replaced by gesture, and vice versa, and that quite often the two occur simultaneously as a means of reinforcing one another. Like DMs in Fraser's model, gestures do not add content to the utterance they accompany, and it seems that all six of Fraser's characteristics can be adapted to apply correspondingly to gestures.<sup>35</sup>

On a larger scale, DMs' global and local structuring functions in conversation suggest an importance of physicality in human conversation. This importance could be well-tested by statistically analyzing DM occurrence and structuring function across different situations which systematically allow or disallow physicality within the conversation. Theoretically, DMs would be more heavily used when physicality is disallowed. This would suggest that those without vision or the ability to gesture would use DMs more, that is, they would employ a discourse structure characteristically different from those with all sensory and physical abilities intact, in that those without vision or gesture ability would rely more heavily on verbal cues than non-verbal cues for discourse structure.

In addition to using the ST to analyze possible variance in DM usage based on availability of non-verbal communication, it would be interesting to analyze DM variance based on psychological development. According to Donna Jo Napoli (2005), children use DMs far less

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<sup>35</sup> e.g., A gesture may have the exact same form as another, but the two have completely different meanings given context and usage; this would be a form of gesture homonymy. When one points the index finger up with the rest of the fingers curled into a fist, it can mean a variety of things, two of which (in American culture) are most broadly described "UP" or "ONE."

than do adults. While adults have much difficulty understanding children's DM-less statements, other children seem to follow child discourse without problem. In our conversation, Napoli provided the following example:

Teacher:           Why did you steal the gerbil?

Child:             I'm allergic to cats.

For the child, it is obvious that her motive for stealing the gerbil is that she is allergic to cats, and seeing as she would like a furry animal as a pet, stealing the gerbil seemed like the perfect solution. For the teacher, however, the child's statement seems entirely out of place and off-topic—most likely an attempt to change the topic from the theft to something else. Without using a DM to correlate her own statement with the teacher's, the child has effectively left the teacher thinking that the child's statement is completely unrelated. If the child had responded, "Well, I'm allergic to cats," the *well* would have given the teacher signal that the child's declaration of cat allergy is related to the gerbil, and the child is not just trying to change the subject. By using the ST to compare usage of DMs at different ages, researchers could start to unravel how human communication develops relative to cognitive and psychological development. By using the ST to analyze the structure of conversation in a much simpler way than was previously possible, researchers have the opportunity to better understand the correlation between language and thought.

**Appendix I: Transcription Symbols of the Corpus of Spoken American English (CSAE)**

<b>TRANSCRIPTION SYMBOL</b>	<b>EXAMPLE</b>	<b>MEANING</b>
--	The way I -- the minute I	Truncated/incomplete intonation contour, after (self-) interruption
-	f- it just pools	Truncated word
[]	A: Wel[l Zen can be bullshit too] B: [...different sources]	Speech overlap, these are numbered consecutively when several overlaps occur close to each other and confusion might arise.
..		Short pause
...		Medium pause
...0		Timed pause
.		Continuing intonation contour
.		Final intonation contour
?		Appeal Contour
%		Glottal stop
<TEXT TEXT>	<YWN Yeah YWN>	Descriptive comments on the quality of speech (Ex: Yawning while speaking)
=	Yeah=	Lengthening of the prior sound
(TEXT)	(YAWN)	Non-verbal vocal sound
(H)		Inhalation
(Hx)		Exhalation
@		Syllables of laughter
<X word X>	<X Maybe X>	Uncertain hearing
X		Indecipherable syllable
&		Indicates to continue with same intonation in next line, or to continue with same intonation as previous line

## Appendix II: Prosodic Transcription Symbols of the London-Lund-Corpus (LLC)

TRANSCRIPTION SYMBOL	EXAMPLE	MEANING
A		Speaker identity marker for speakers unaware of the recording of their conversation
A		Speaker identity marker for speakers aware of the recording of their conversation
(( ))	((would))	Text is incomprehensible Believed word is "would"
((3 sylls))		Text is incomprehensible, but has 3 identifiable syllables
A: * ... * B: ... * ... *	A: **^yes** B: **I've**	Simultaneous talk between A and B
.	Yes - I've	Pause Yes + pause + I've
.	That is perhaps	Brief pause That is + brief pause + perhaps
^	^no I ^no I	Tone unit onset
#	^yes#	Tone unit boundary

(Greenbaum & Svartvik 1990)

The original *London-Lund-Corpus* (LLC) uses a very sophisticated marking system to note the prosodic features of spoken discourse. For the purposes of this paper, such sophisticated prosodic annotation was unneeded; therefore I have retained only those transcription features in the above table. Features available in the LLC are tone units, onsets, location of nuclei, direction of nuclear tones, two degrees of pause, two degrees of stress, speaker identity, simultaneous talk, contextual comment and incomprehensible words.

As suggested by the difference in how a speaker identity is noted in the LLC, not all participants were aware of the preservation of their conversation.

## Appendix III: sbcoo5 "A Book About Death"

102.02 104.08 PAMELA: [@@@@@  
102.46 105.68 DARRYL: <@ doesn't come out XXX @> @@@@@@@@@@@@].  
104.08 105.33 PAMELA: (H) <@ Kay @>,  
105.33 105.68 (H)]  
105.73 107.03 comes out very hellish.  
107.03 107.82 DARRYL: (H) Yeah=.  
107.82 108.86 PAMELA: Very hellish.  
108.86 109.85 DARRYL: .. So what <X did that [have to d]o X> --  
109.35 110.15 PAMELA: [But it's so] good\_/god/  
--  
110.15 111.30 k=- so good going down.  
111.30 111.45 Th-,  
111.45 111.62 [I mean],  
111.45 111.58 DARRYL: [What did] --  
111.62 113.37 PAMELA: there's there's the opposites again.  
113.37 114.12 DARRYL: It's it's [ma-] --  
113.89 114.74 PAMELA: [The] food is like,  
114.74 115.46 all [2unique2],  
115.03 115.40 DARRYL: [2Hey2].  
115.46 116.11 PAMELA: and [3wonderful],  
115.73 117.68 DARRYL: [3I- it's major-league3] Yin and Yang.  
116.11 116.83 PAMELA: and heavenly3]  
117.68 118.92 ... (TSK) major league.  
118.92 120.97 DARRYL: .. What does that have so do with heaven and  
hell in the book.  
120.97 122.93 PAMELA: ... Well,  
122.93 124.98 ... % I'm just sort of= reiterating.  
124.98 127.13 ... I could read you some.  
127.13 127.49 DARRYL: [No].  
127.27 128.41 PAMELA: [I] mean is that allowed?  
128.41 132.06 DARRYL: ... No I I don't want to hear anything out of a  
book with,  
132.06 133.61 .. chapter called heaven and hell.  
133.61 134.36 PAMELA: You don't.  
134.36 135.01 DARRYL: .. No.  
135.01 135.81 PAMELA: Nkay.  
135.81 137.71 Well then let's talk about [our vacation].  
136.86 138.99 DARRYL: [I'm gonna be]  
closed-minded about it.  
138.99 140.92 PAMELA: (TSK) ... Oh dear.  
140.92 141.17 (Hx)  
141.17 141.72 DARRYL: (H) [But,  
141.42 141.94 PAMELA: [That's hell]].  
141.84 142.74 DARRYL: .. I] didn't like the book,  
142.74 143.19 the way I --  
143.19 144.29 the minute I looked at it.

(CSAE: A Book About Death)

This is a random excerpt from the sbc0005 data file, in its original transcribed form. I have only included one page, as the entirety of the file can be found in the ST in Appendix IV, and inclusion of the whole file for mere comparison would be gratuitous.

**Appendix IV: Structured Transcript of sbc0005**  
(pages 1 through 29, attached)

# EVENT $\alpha$

Recording Date:	04 June, 1989
Recording Duration:	0:46:14
Neighborhood:	private home in Santa Barbara
Building:	private home
Room:	private home, bedroom
Spoken Discourse Type:	face to face conversation
Specific Situation:	chatting in bed

## Speaker I, Channel 1

DARRYL, m, 33, San Francisco, CA, BA, comm./comp, white

- \*likes to play with words
- \*middle-aged
- \*doesn't want to be told what/how to think
- \*questions others' authority/knowledge

## Speaker II, Channel 2

PAMELA, f, 38, Southern California, CA, BA, actress, white

- \*enjoys reading
- \*previously married (unhappily)
- \*thinking about death a lot
- \*middle-aged
- \*looking for a sort of guide to things she doesn't understand
- \*grandmother (recently?) died

CHANNEL 1

CHANNEL 2

---



**S  
P  
E  
A  
K  
E  
R  
  
I**  
  
**Event**  
  
**α**

**S  
P  
E  
A  
K  
E  
R  
  
II**  
  
**Event**  
  
**α**

	... (H) that the marriage itself=,	48.26 52.19
	I mean as h=ellish as it was,	52.19 54.04
	... % .. it's like it pulled me under,	54.04 58.04
	like a giant octopus,	58.04 59.49
	or a giant,	59.49 60.49
	% ... giant shark.	60.49 62.25
	(H) And it pulled me all the way under.	62.25 63.98
	And then,	63.98 64.43
	(H) ... and there I was,	64.43 67.10
	it was like the silent scream,	67.10 68.50
	and then,	68.50 68.95
	.. then I found that .. I% was on my own two feet again.	68.95 71.85
	And it r=eally was --	71.85 73.00
	(H) .. (Hx) ... % .. % (Hx) (H) (TSK)	73.00 80.26
	S: what was hell in that .. that marriage became,	80.26 82.87
	... became a way out for me.	82.87 86.50
	... It was the flip side.	86.50 88.65
	(H) .. It's like sometimes you go through things,	88.65 91.00
	... and you come out the other side of them,	91.00 92.77
	<WH you WH> .. come out so much better.	92.77 94.32
	... (H) And if I hadn't had that,	94.32 96.32
	if I hadn't had --	96.32 97.27
	[(H)]	97.27 97.80
97.27 98.58	[It's not the way] with food.	
	... What do you mean.	98.58 100.19
100.19 102.46	...(H) What goes in [one way,	
	[@@@@@]	102.02 104.08
102.46 105.68	<@ doesn't come out XXX @> @@@@@@@@@@@@@].	
	(H) <@ Kay @>,	104.08 105.33
	(H)]	105.33 105.68

S  
P  
E  
A  
K  
E  
R  
I

Event

α

134.36 135.01	.. No.	Nkay.	135.01 135.81
		Well then let's talk about [our vacation].	135.81 137.71
136.86 138.99	about it. [I'm gonna be] closed-minded	(TSK) ... Oh dear.	138.99 140.92
		(Hx)	140.92 141.17
141.17 141.72	(H) [But,	[That's hell].	141.42 141.94
141.84 142.74	.. I] didn't like the book,	... You didn't.	144.29 145.39
142.74 143.19	the way I --	That's cause you,	146.14 146.84
143.19 144.29	the minute I looked at it.	... ah.	152.36 153.51
145.39 146.14	No.	[(TSK) (H) Well].	165.39 166.64
146.84 149.98	... That's because I have my own ideas about it,	[2<% Remember2],	166.94 167.69
149.98 150.58	I guess.	remember it in the movie %>,	167.69 168.69
150.58 152.36	That I'm .. pretty comfortable with.	in Beetlejuice?	168.69 169.59
153.51 155.86	... I don't like re- --		
155.86 159.45	I don't like reading books about what other people		
159.45 163.64	think about dying.		
163.64 166.94	... And I,		
	.. consider myself a real free [thinker when it		
	comes to that] stuff.		
166.94 167.54	[2And that's2] --		

S  
P  
E  
A  
K  
E  
R  
II

Event

α

222.97 224.22	because it's [bullshit.
224.22 225.49	Who knows what death] is.
231.69 232.29 232.29 233.19 233.19 234.69	[Yeah but I do know, it it's an awfully, it's it's] an awfully presumptuous thing,
234.69 236.34	to sit down and write a book about [2death,
236.41 237.26	when you haven't died2].
243.42 245.17	Well] the Zen can be bullshit too].
245.17 245.32 245.32 247.77	I mean, [whoever wrote the book of Zen wasn't dead either.
247.77 247.82	@(Hx)]

S  
P  
E  
A  
K  
E  
R  
I

Event  
α

[(H) <% Well --	223.49 224.24
	224.22 225.49
What --	224.59 224.74
d- %>] --	224.74 225.59
%what what this man has put in the boo- --	225.59 227.59
You haven't read the book,	227.59 228.74
one.	228.74 228.94
You haven't read the book,	228.94 229.89
so you don't know.	229.89 230.79
... [I haven't read the book so I don't know,	230.79 233.39
but (H)],	233.39 233.99
[2d- --	236.11 236.41
	236.41 237.26
It has,	236.41 236.96
it2] has,	236.96 237.51
it has stories in there from,	237.51 239.40
(H) from the Zen= an=d,	239.40 241.32
.. f- it just pools on other different --	241.32 243.42
[% .. different sources].	243.42 245.02
Well <F it .. might all= be bullshit F>,	245.64 247.63
but,	247.78 247.97

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300.59 301.44	(H)
320.27 321.22	I've read that.
327.68 333.53	... (H) So why are you reading a book about dying,
340.67 342.12	.. you don't know?
344.19 344.72	Why.
344.72 348.20	... You're alive.
348.20 350.25	Why are you r=eadng a book about dying.
354.08 354.88	% <W Why W>.
354.88 357.96	... I mean,
357.96 358.26	you know,
358.26 360.79	y=ou ask someone why they're interested in electronics,
360.79 362.24	and they can probably tell you.
362.24 363.24	(H)

... And I read that l=ater.	301.44 305.92
You know it was much later I read that in a book where,	305.92 308.42
(H) ... u=m,	308.42 309.88
... (H) people who .. %had .. % technically died, and then have been revived.	309.88 315.81 315.81 317.18
... (H) Saw .. relatives coming for them.	317.18 320.27
(H) Course that may be what happens=, .. prior to the big, .. the big nothing.	321.22 323.78 323.78 325.13 325.13 327.68
... <P I don't know P>.	333.53 340.67
.. I have an interest in it.	342.12 344.19
... I've always been interested in it.	350.25 354.08
... @@@@	363.24 365.75
(H) Well,	365.75 367.33
I don't know,	367.33 367.92

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		she got,	421.21 421.71
		the woman's got a re=p.	421.71 422.91
422.91 424.17	(YAWN)		
		And so she .. she lives,	424.17 425.84
		and,	
426.32 427.12	<YWN Yeah YWN>.		
		I guess it's j- looking at my mother,	427.12 428.57
		too,	428.57 428.93
		I n- --	428.93 429.38
		% (Hx)	429.38 430.08
430.08 433.33	... What does that have to do with why you're		
433.33 433.96	reading a book on death?		
	[(H)]		
		[(H)] .. I've always been interested in death.	433.59 436.13
436.13 437.18	... <F Why= F>.		
437.18 437.44	(H)		
		Why,	437.44 437.89
437.89 438.59	<WH @@ WH>		
		... (H) @@ [yeah I'm laughing].	438.59 442.12
441.17 441.78	[What is] --		
		(H) I'm thinking one thing my mother always used	
		to say=,	442.12 444.67
		when I wouldn't go bicycling with my [father],	444.67 446.52
446.24 447.01	[<@ ~Pamela],		
447.01 448.25	you are [2@@@,		
		[2she would say2],	447.18 448.28
448.25 449.45	you are @@@ @>2] --		
		she would say,	448.28 449.80
		(H) <Q you'll be s=orry when we're dead Q>.	449.80 453.34
453.34 455.35	@Because you would[n't bicycling]?		

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490.73 494.45	... <YWN So that's why you're interested in death YWN>?
496.74 499.24	(YAWN) (TSK)
518.64 525.69	... Yeah?
526.58 527.33	[<WH @@ WH>]
527.45 529.10	[2That's why you're interested in death?
529.10 529.59	@ @2]
532.34 533.68	... Yeah?
533.68 534.15	... Yeah,
534.15 534.75	we] it i=s.
541.52 542.55	[(H) So (H)],
542.55 543.32	so you're running,

(SIGH)	494.45 497.64
... (TSK) (TSK) <X Maybe X> it's because my parents were ol=d? When I was young? Very very young? ... I've always= ... thought it's w=eird, that we've been -- ... (H) I look down at my body? ... And I f=eel like I'm in a spaceship.	499.24 503.40 503.40 504.35 504.35 505.24 505.24 509.74 509.74 511.84 511.84 512.59 512.59 515.02 515.02 518.64
[@]@@@@	525.69 527.33
[2(H) I just,	527.33 528.08
(H) n- and,	528.08 529.05
I just2] think it's <MRC so damn weird MRC> we're here.	529.10 532.34
And, and I was constructed, ... inside of some w=oman's w=omb, ... (H) and I was [... burped out],	534.75 535.05 535.05 536.97 536.97 539.63 539.63 542.72

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581.12 581.37 well,  
 581.37 583.04 what if worrying about that,  
 583.04 584.40 has got in the way=,  
 584.40 586.16 ... gotten in the way,  
 of you making positive choices for yourself in your  
 586.16 589.72 life.  
 589.72 593.22 ... (H) Instead of just worrying about,  
 593.22 594.42 w- that you're he=re,  
 594.42 597.08 ... and making the best out of it.

---

604.24 606.88 ... Those are two different words=,  
 606.88 608.38 and they mean two different things.

---

611.90 612.15 @@

---

612.96 614.66 [Y- .. you may be elusive],  
 615.88 616.13 (H)  
 616.13 617.07 ... well,

---

617.52 619.12 yeah but .. but .. but=,  
 619.12 620.72 % to me the whole point is is,  
 620.72 625.17 ... you have no idea,  
 625.17 627.17 what happens before or after.  
 627.17 630.53 ... You have no idea.  
 630.53 633.56 ... You can read books about it,  
 633.56 635.56 and you can .. (H) talk about it,  
 635.56 638.75 ... but the most pragmatic thing to do is,

%See, 579.17 579.73  
 this is what you told !Deven. 579.73 581.12

---

... Being here is=, 597.08 599.65  
 .. is so illusive sometimes. 599.65 601.73  
 ... I mean .. illusionary. 601.73 604.24

---

Well it's illusionary. 608.23 609.40  
 ... I take back what I said about @illusive, 609.40 611.90

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(H) [@@ (H) @@@@]@@@ (H) 612.15 615.88

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Mm, 617.07 617.52

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685.90 687.70	Don't make light of what I'm saying.
701.36 702.85	[(H)] (Hx)
702.85 704.90	... Well,
704.90 706.00	.. sometimes for me,
706.00 707.57	they are a whip and a hairshirt.
707.94 709.52	[<WH @@@@ WH>]
714.63 716.87	... (TSK) .. Year,
716.87 717.12	ah,
717.12 717.52	yeah I mean,
717.52 718.82	sometimes I have to be [real prep] --
719.00 719.88	.. What.
722.50 723.63	What did she,
723.63 724.44	[what did she say],

... No.	687.70 688.61
... Think about the kids.	688.61 692.25
What are --	692.25 692.65
who are,	692.65 693.15
who are these kids.	693.15 694.30
... <W Who are these kids W>.	694.30 696.55
.. @ (H)	696.55 698.15
... These little seedpods,	698.15 699.84
... (H) that have been sent [our way].	699.84 702.09
@@@@@@	707.57 709.52
(H) They're little,	709.52 711.11
.. little,	711.11 711.61
... little lessons.	711.61 713.20
@@@ (H)	713.20 714.63
[(GASP)]	718.27 719.00
	719.00 719.88
XX,	719.88 720.50
!Natalie asked me about Santa Claus today.	720.50 722.50
[In the laundro]mat.	723.93 724.68
She said,	724.68 725.18

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770.03 770.92	Oh Go=d,
770.92 771.82	[-Pamela].
775.81 776.87	(H)
804.10 804.81	[(H)]
805.04 805.64	[2Year but what d-2],

... love fills the stockings.	768.15 770.13
[@@@ She] said,	770.62 772.27
(H) she said,	772.27 773.34
oh you mean,	773.34 774.14
... adults=?	774.14 775.81
... Adults who wanna show you how much they care,	776.87 779.93
and I said,	779.93 780.58
... (H) yeah.	780.58 781.60
Adults=,	781.60 782.39
adults around who love you.	782.39 784.22
... Fill those stockings.	784.22 785.81
... (H) And I said,	785.81 787.72
she said but some adults= talk about Santa Claus,	787.72 790.49
I said that's because,	790.49 791.48
.. they wanna believe in Santa Claus.	791.48 793.17
(H) And that's what I told her,	793.17 794.44
I said,	794.44 794.69
I wanna believe in Santa Claus.	794.69 796.45
.. In fact sometimes I d=0 believe in Santa Claus.	796.45 800.43
... And that,	800.43 803.39
... that really [satisfied her].	803.39 804.82
(H) [2<F But I thought2] it was very pragmatic of her to ask about that in June F>.	804.82 808.52
(H) I thought to myself,	808.52 809.62
if she asked me that,	809.62 810.81

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			[The definition=] of the word	[Seemingly con-],	848.97 849.78
				(H) and I had a hard time with the definition.	849.78 852.02
				.. (H) So I thought .. God.	852.02 853.52
				(H) A wor=d.	853.52 854.60
				(H) .. That I'm supposed to lear=n,	854.60 856.34
				(H) and I get this definition,	856.34 857.79
				and I don't even understand [the defini=tion].	857.79 859.79
858.91 861.19	861.19 863.23	863.23 867.18	867.18 869.01	paradox, is by design ambiguous. ... Chew on this one. An ambiguous paradox.	
872.02 872.81				Yes.	
873.13 874.88				[@ (GROAN) <WH @@ `WH>]	
				... Is that redundant?	869.01 872.02
				[@ (GROAN) @] @@ (H)	872.81 875.96
				... Well,	875.96 876.46
				.. that was age twelve.	876.46 877.71
				.. So %-,	877.71 878.21
				that was very close to !Deven's age,	878.21 879.95
				when,	879.95 880.18
				... (H) I sort of=,	880.18 881.61
				.. bit my teeth into that one.	881.61 883.26
883.26 884.31	884.31 884.49			Bit your teeth, hunh?	
885.58 886.66				[@@@@]@@	
				(H) And then, yeah.	884.49 885.43 885.43 885.81
				[As I went], @@@@[2@@@@2]	885.81 886.42 886.66 888.66
887.26 889.51				[2@@@@@@@@2]	

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		(H) You see eyes, ... you see .. body, you see hair, you see, @[@@@]	931.39 932.89 932.89 934.96 934.96 935.74 935.74 936.31 936.31 938.73
937.72 939.22	[@@@]@@		
		((SLAP)) <@ S- get your hands off me @>. [(H)]	939.22 941.37 941.37 942.34
941.65 942.30	[(H)]		
		Y=ou <HI see HI> all those things, right?	942.34 943.99 943.99 944.40
944.40 945.41	[<VOX Yea=h VOX>].		944.40 945.41
		[But there's] there's me= insi=de. .. That's ... invisible.	944.88 946.21 946.21 947.14 947.14 949.90
949.90 953.10 953.10 954.55 954.55 955.70	... It's not, ... it's it's n- it's it's,		
		(H) I mean, (H) what if, what if you took the same ... spacesuit? ... And you put another spirit into it. ... It would be [a different person,	955.05 955.70 955.70 956.35 956.35 959.78 959.78 962.68 962.68 965.40
964.41 965.10 965.10 966.20 966.20 971.38	[<@ It'd say, let me out @>. (LAUGHTER)]		
		(LAUGHTER)] It would be, .. a different person.	965.40 971.38 971.38 972.13 972.13 973.13
973.13 976.81	... <X You're X> [right].		
		[I] wouldn't [2be2] me.	976.57 977.70
977.13 977.38	[2Right2].		

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1009.11 1010.11 ... As it were.  
 1010.11 1010.91 .. (H) (Hx)

---

1015.15 1015.78 [Ye=s.  
 1015.78 1016.55 Yes right].  
 1016.55 1016.92 .. R- you know.  
 1016.92 1018.80 and it depends on your brain dolphin level,  
 1018.80 1019.11 [and],

---

1020.42 1020.72 [2mm2],

---

1021.58 1023.96 ... you [know]?

---

1023.98 1024.73 <X I- depend am- X>,  
 1024.73 1025.13 yeah.  
 1025.13 1025.51 Yeah.  
 1025.51 1027.61 ... A lot of it has to do with the with the,  
 1027.61 1028.61 .. the r=- --  
 ... (TSK) (H) five dollars and ninety-eight cents  
 worth of chemicals and compounds that make  
 you.

---

1028.61 1033.38

---

1039.91 1040.76 <F Why= F>.

... Hm=, 1010.91 1012.13  
 .. Sort of dictates how I feel about being in [.. this  
 spacesuit], 1012.13 1016.25

---

[(H)] My brain dolphin, 1018.85 1020.15  
 XX [2X2] X, 1020.15 1020.80

---

that's sweet. 1020.80 1021.58

---

[Hunh]. 1023.54 1023.98

---

... % We could spend a lot of our life,  
 trying to, 1033.38 1038.02  
 to contradict that. 1038.02 1038.72  
 1038.72 1039.91

---

(H) Well, 1040.76 1041.76  
 [Because], 1041.76 1042.63

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1079.87 1080.82 @@@@4]

1082.09 1082.29 [(H)]

1088.25 1088.72 (H) [W-] --

1092.28 1093.38 (H) Well how is write- --  
 1093.38 1095.61 reading a book written by some schmuck,  
 1095.61 1097.46 who thinks he's an expert on d=eath,  
 1097.46 1097.68 (H)

1099.95 1103.51 ... (H) Anyone who sits down to write a book  
 about d=eath,

1103.51 1104.91 .. with the hopes of enlightening,  
 1104.91 1106.19 his fellow human beings,  
 1106.19 1108.09 (H) .. is in my book a schmuck.

1111.47 1112.49 [@@@@@]

[4My yearning, 1078.34 1079.14  
 my yearning4],

my yearning is n- -- 1080.82 1081.97  
 .. [maybe] not to run ahead and, 1081.97 1083.32

.. and, 1083.32 1083.82  
 ... and, 1083.82 1084.27  
 and get to the exit. 1084.27 1085.47  
 (H) As -- 1085.47 1086.70  
 ... 1086.70 1088.25

It mean maybe it's the yearning %, 1088.53 1090.23  
 .. for where I was before I was born. 1090.23 1092.28

Well he may or may not be a schmuck, 1097.68 1099.39  
 ~Darryl. 1099.39 1099.95

... (TSK) (H) Well now, 1108.09 1110.19  
 ... <VOX them's fightin' [wor=ds, 1110.19 1112.16

boy= VOX>. 1112.16 1112.59  
 @ <@ You could @> -- 1112.59 1113.54

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1162.99 1164.49 he should keep it to [himself].

[(H)] you know, 1163.99 1164.82  
 % % (Hx) 1164.82 1166.15  
 ... I felt l- after !Gretchen died, 1166.15 1168.05  
 it was all .. rather unfair. 1168.05 1169.90  
 I mean 1169.90 1170.25  
 % % the tides at work, 1170.25 1171.75  
 ... just swept over her so quickly. 1171.75 1174.00  
 ... (H) And it [was like], 1174.00 1175.41

1175.03 1176.58 [But really] not so quickly,  
 1176.58 1176.93 it was,  
 1176.93 1177.18 <X<P yeah P>X>,  
 1177.18 1177.63 I mean  
 1177.63 1180.58 it was something that had started in her a very  
 long time ago.

... She was gone in less than, 1180.58 1184.34  
 ... five months. 1184.34 1186.91  
 .. Six -- 1186.91 1187.36  
 Eight months. 1187.36 1188.01

1188.01 1190.66 ... (H) (THROAT)

... And it just=, 1190.66 1193.16  
 ... amazes me=. 1193.16 1194.82  
 (H) I mean, 1194.82 1196.95  
 you can't drag on and on and on about a fellow  
 creature who's gone, 1196.95 1200.75  
  
 (H) ... but I still miss my grandmother. 1200.75 1204.16  
 ... And I, 1204.16 1209.37  
 ... I certainly miss my do=g. 1209.37 1211.22  
 ... (H) I just think it's so wei=rd, 1211.22 1219.90  
 that they're go=ne. 1219.90 1220.75  
 ... And where did they go to. 1220.75 1223.04  
 ... 1223.04 1228.06

**Appendix V: Sample of My Early Attempt to Visually Represent Topic**  
(pages 1 through 6, attached)

①

... suspect Discourse Marker

# EVENT 1

Carmen Barron, Senior Thesis

## APPENDIX V:

SAMPLE OF MY EARLY ATTEMPT TO VISUALLY REPRESENT TOPIC

CHANNEL 1 TURNS		CHANNEL 2 TURNS	
570.60 575.18 575.18 576.13	DARRYL: ... (H) What if. A What .. if=.	576.13 577.13	PAMELA: (Hx) Unhu=nh?
577.13 579.17	A DARRYL: What if worrying about that,	579.17 579.73 579.73 581.12	PAMELA: %See? this is what you told !Deven. B
581.12 581.37 581.37 583.04 583.04 584.40 584.40 586.16 586.16 589.72 in your life. 589.72 593.22 593.22 594.42 594.42 597.08	A DARRYL: well, what if worrying about that, has got in the way= ... gotten in the way, of you making positive choices for yourself ... (H) Instead of just worrying about, w- that you're he=re. ... and making the best out of it.	597.08 599.65 599.65 601.73 601.73 604.24	PAMELA: .. Being here is= .. is so illusive sometimes. C .. I mean .. illusionary. D
604.24 606.88 606.88 608.38	C DARRYL: ... Those are two different words= D and they mean two different things.	608.23 609.40 609.40 611.90	PAMELA: Well, it's illusionary. D ... I take back what I said about C @illusive
611.90 612.15	DARRYL: @@	612.15 615.88	PAMELA: (H) [@@ (H) @@@@]@@@ (H)
612.96 614.66 615.88 616.13 616.13 617.07	DARRYL: [Y- .. you may be @lusive] (H) C' ... well	617.07 617.52	PAMELA: Mm?
617.52 619.12 619.12 620.72 620.72 625.17 625.17 627.17 627.17 630.53 630.53 633.56 633.56 635.56 635.56 638.75 638.75 640.05	A DARRYL: yeah, but .. but .. but= % to me the whole point is is, ... you have no idea, what happens before or after. ... You have no idea. ... You can read books about it, and you can .. (H) talk about it, ... but the most pragmatic thing to do is, to just ... live it.	640.05 642.40	PAMELA: ... Hm?
642.40 644.64 644.64 646.32	A DARRYL: ... Learn the rules of the game, ... play the game,	646.32 647.16	PAMELA: For what. A
647.16 649.25 649.25 653.11	DARRYL: ... for whatever you wa=nt. A ... For what=ever you wa=nt.		

### Topics in Event 1

- A: Pamela's preoccupation w/ death
- ↳ A' Love joke
- B: "what Darryl told Deven"

- C: illusive error
- ↳ C': elusive joke
- D: illusionary life

- E: "what are these kids"
- ↳ E': Natalie's question A Santa Claus
- F: the microphone/being recorded

- G: the word "paradox"
- ↳ G': "bit my teeth" joke/word game
- ↳ G'': commentary on use of clichés



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653.11 656.14 656.14 656.99 656.99 657.74 657.74 658.97 658.97 660.30	A	... Be a= doctor, or a screen writer, or an actress, or a philanthropist, or= an explorer=?			
660.30 665.43	PAMELA:	... <VOX An explorer VOX>.			A
665.43 666.68 666.68 667.98 667.98 668.53 668.53 670.01 670.01 672.61	A DARRYL:	... Do what you want, with the time you have. Learn, ... give, ... whatever.			
672.61 674.01	PAMELA:	... Love?			A
674.01 675.08	A' DARRYL:	%Lo=ve?			A'
675.08 676.02	PAMELA:	<VOX Love?>			A'
675.27 676.02	DARRYL:	[@@@]			
676.02 677.68	PAMELA:	(H) Could [2I2] love you?			A'
676.60 676.85 677.68 677.93	DARRYL:	[2X2] @			
677.93 680.01 680.01 682.20 682.20 682.95	PAMELA:	@@@ @@@ (H) Could I love you while I'm here VOX>? .. (H) (Hx)			A'
682.95 683.20	DARRYL:	(H)			
683.20 685.90	PAMELA:	... (H)			
685.90 687.70	A DARRYL:	Don't make light of what I'm saying.			
687.70 688.61 688.61 692.25 692.25 692.65 692.65 693.15 693.15 694.30 694.30 696.55 696.55 698.15 698.15 699.84 699.84 702.09	PAMELA:	... N=0? ... Think about the kids. What are -- who are, who are these kids. ... <W Who are these kids W>. .. @ (H) ... These little seedpods, ... (H) that have been sent [our way].			E
701.36 702.85 702.85 704.90 704.90 706.00 706.00 707.57	E DARRYL:	... Well? .. sometimes for me, they are a whip and a hairshirt.			
707.57 709.52	PAMELA:	@[@@@@@]			
707.94 709.52	DARRYL:	<WH @@@@ WH>			
709.52 711.11 711.11 711.61 711.61 713.20 713.20 714.63	PAMELA:	(H) They're little, .. little, ... little lessons. @@@ (H)			E
714.63 716.87	DARRYL:	... (TSK) ... Yeah?			

716.87 717.12	F	ah, yeah I mean,	
717.12 717.52		sometimes I have to be [real prep] --	
717.52 718.82		.. what?	
719.00 719.88	DARRYL:		
719.88 720.50	PAMELA:	XX, Natalie asked me about Santa Claus today.	F
720.50 722.50			
722.50 723.63	F	DARRYL: what did she, [what did she say],	
723.63 724.44			
723.93 724.68	PAMELA:	[in the laundrymat, she said,	F
724.68 725.18		.. mom,	
725.18 726.68		Santa Claus isn't,	
726.68 728.68		.. I mean,	
728.68 730.68		d- is there a for real Sa- Santa Claus?	
730.68 732.68		.. I said a for real Santa Claus,	
732.68 735.08		you mean a man who lives .. at the north	
735.08 736.33		.. (H) she said yeah,	
736.33 738.33		I said no,	
738.33 739.27		.. (H) And she said,	
739.27 739.58		well,	
739.58 740.58		who are the other ones,	
740.58 741.12		I said well,	
741.12 742.87		they're the spirit of Santa Claus,	
742.87 743.12		and,	
743.12 745.47		.. (H) they represent Santa Claus,	
745.47 745.77		they --	
745.77 747.57		(H) they're a picture [of Santa Claus],	
746.62 748.36	F	DARRYL: [They're Santa Claus's]	
748.36 749.55	PAMELA:	.. @@@	F
749.55 751.35		(H) They're pictures of Santa Claus,	
751.35 754.14		.. Is my mike on,	
754.14 754.78	DARRYL:	Unhuhh?	
754.78 755.71	PAMELA:	Oh,	
755.71 756.19		[Okay,	
756.19 757.15	PAMELA:	(H) And],	F
756.85 758.88	F	DARRYL: you [just] damn near broke the damn needle	
758.88 759.95	PAMELA:	and then she said,	
759.95 762.12		.. and then she said well,	
762.12 763.81		who fills the stockings,	F

3

3

4

24

			763.81 767.67 767.67 768.15 768.15 770.13		... And I kind of, I said, ... love fills the stockings.	E'
770.03 770.92 770.92 771.82	E'	DARRYL:	Oh Go=d, [~Pamela].			
			770.62 772.27 772.27 773.34 773.34 774.14 774.14 775.81	PAMELA:	[@@@ She] said, (H) she said, oh you mean, ... adults=?	E'
775.81 776.87		DARRYL:	(H)			
			776.87 779.93 779.93 780.58 780.58 781.60 781.60 782.39 782.39 784.22 784.22 785.81 785.81 787.72 787.72 790.49 790.49 791.48 791.48 793.17 793.17 794.44 794.44 794.69 794.69 796.45 796.45 800.43 800.43 803.39 803.39 804.82	PAMELA:	... Adults who wanna show you how much they care, and I said, ... (H) yeah. Adults= adults around who love you. ... Fill those stockings. ... (H) And I said, she said but some adults= talk about Santa Claus, I said that's because, .. they wanna believe in Santa Claus. (H) And that's what I told her, I said, I wanna believe in Santa Claus. .. In fact sometimes I d= believe in ... And that, ... that really [satisfied her].	E'
804.10 804.81		DARRYL:	[(H)]			
			804.82 808.52	PAMELA:	(H) [2<F But I thought2] it was very pragmatic of her to ask about that in June F>.0	E
805.04 805.64		DARRYL:	A? [2Yeah but what d-2],			
			808.52 809.62 809.62 810.81 810.81 811.20 811.19 812.40	PAMELA:	(H) I thought to myself, if she asked me that, like, [on] [2Christmas2] [3Eve3],	E
811.27 813.67 811.49 811.82	E/E	DARRYL:	[well] [2she2] [3must have gotten some3] sort of a signal somewhere. >ENV: [2((MICROPHONE))2]			
815.41 817.01 817.01 818.50	A/E	DARRYL:	<X I mean X> what does that have to do with death. ... <WH @@@ WH>			
			813.67 815.61	PAMELA:	Today in the laundromat?	E'

5

5

can't lot to be  
a secret; not  
clearly YA


		818.50 819.60 819.60 820.80 820.80 822.08	PAMELA:	... Well, .. we were talking about .. death= and illusions,	E/D
822.08 822.37	DARRYL: (H)				
		822.37 824.13 824.13 825.46 825.46 825.76 825.76 827.06 827.06 827.71	PAMELA:	the illusions of this life, .. (H) you know? I -- (H) .. % I, % I,	D/A
827.71 828.86	DARRYL: X X [X],				
		828.73 830.88 twelve VOX>, 830.88 833.63	PAMELA:	[<VOX my] favorite word when I was ... was paradox.	G
833.28 835.67	G DARRYL: ... <YWN Why YWN>.				
		835.67 836.47 836.47 837.71 837.71 838.69 838.69 840.36 840.36 842.11 842.11 844.06 844.06 845.71 845.71 847.87	PAMELA:	(H) Because, ... I thought, .. any wor=d, ... that was defined. .. I mean I remember the definition. .. (H) That I learned in seventh grade. .. (H) That was paradox. .. (H) Seemingly contrary.	G
847.87 850.27	G DARRYL: ... (TSK) [Seemingly <P X X X P>].				
		848.97 849.78 849.78 852.02 definition. 852.02 853.52 853.52 854.60 854.60 856.34 856.34 857.79 857.79 859.79	PAMELA:	[Seemingly con-], (H) and I had a hard time with the definition. .. (H) So I thought .. God. (H) A wor=d. (H) .. That I'm supposed to lear=n, (H) and I get this definition, and I don't even understand [the defini=ti=on]	G/D
858.91 861.19	G DARRYL: [The definition=]				
861.19 863.23	of the word paradox,				
863.23 867.18	is by design ambiguous.				
867.18 869.01	... Chew on this one. An ambiguous paradox.				
872.02 872.81	G DARRYL: Yes.	869.01 872.02	PAMELA:	... Is that redundant?	G
873.13 874.88	DARRYL: [G (GROAN) <WH @@ WH>]	872.81 875.96	PAMELA:	[G (GROAN) G] @@ (H)	
		875.96 876.46 876.46 877.71 877.71 878.21 878.21 879.95	PAMELA:	... Well, .. that was age twelve. .. So *), that was very close to !Deven's age,	G

6

*Handwritten scribble*

			879.95 880.18 880.18 881.61 881.61 883.26	when, ... (H) I sort of=, .. bit my teeth into that one.	G
883.26 884.31 884.31 884.49	G' DARRYL:	Bit your teeth, hunh?			
			884.49 885.43 885.43 885.81 @	PAMELA: (H) And then, yeah. ..	G' G'
885.58 886.66	DARRYL:	[@@@]@			
			885.81 886.42 886.66 888.66	PAMELA: [As I went], @@[2@@@2]	G
887.26 889.51	DARRYL:	[2@@@@@@@2]			
889.49 891.04	DARRYL:	(H) @@	888.71 889.69	PAMELA: (H) I,	G'
891.04 891.36 891.36 893.84	G' DARRYL:	<@ Is, is that like c=utting it [in the] nip= @>?	890.39 891.19	PAMELA: took a bite?	G'
893.84 895.93	DARRYL:	@@@@@@@	892.72 893.30	PAMELA: [@@]	
			895.33 898.24 898.24 900.89	PAMELA: (H) ... I, I get a little [ahead <@ of myself] @>.	G''
898.64 900.89 900.89 902.62 902.62 903.68	G'' DARRYL:	[@@@@ (H)] <@ Yeah, I guess you do @>. @@@@ (H)			
			903.68 908.02	PAMELA: [(H) Oh God I hope this doesn't] all sound real s=tupid.	G
903.96 906.60	DARRYL:	[(H) X= @]			
			908.02 909.12 909.12 910.84 910.84 911.54 911.54 912.99 912.99 913.42 913.42 916.96 916.96 917.99 917.99 919.63 919.63 921.55	PAMELA: @@@ (H) ... Well? .. % From, .. from twelve to seventeen, then, ... that went from paradox, ... to, ... the invisible, .. interfacing with the visible.	
921.55 923.66	DARRYL:	... (TSK) Hunh?			
			923.66 924.70 924.70 925.95 925.95 928.23	PAMELA: @@@ The invisible. ... inter[facings] with the visible.	G
926.84 927.54	DARRYL: G	[Facing X]			
			928.23 929.64 929.64 931.39	PAMELA: (H) For everything you see. You can look at me and I'm a body.	G

## Appendix VI: Web page Hypertext Relations



← This web page about the history of the US uses hypertext to link the page with other pages which provide more information about topics mentioned in the page. In this web page, the hypertext is underlined and in bold, for example *United States*.

By clicking on *United States* on the first web page, a second web page opens with general facts about the US, meanwhile the first page is still accessible.



(Highbeam Research, 2005)

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